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1Introduction
Detente is dead. SALT is discredited but START is 
not living up to its name. Reports continue of Soviet 
treaty violations and there are calls in the United 
States for the renunciation of SALT II. The ABM 
accords are increasingly threatened by enthusiastic 
plans for a "Strategic Defense Initiative." Leading 
experts remain pessimistic about the chances of any 
major breakthrough in negotiations and even 
fatalistically conclude that arms control has reached 
an "intellectual dead end."* The hopes and expectations 
raised by the signing of the first Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty are gone.
What went wrong? Why have past arms control 
efforts proved so utterly unable to bring increased 
security, lower military spending, or a process of 
actual disarmament? Traditional explanations are often 
unsatisfactory.
One explanation might be termed the "irrational 
man" model. Successful arms control and disarmament, 
in this view, is only a matter of will. Since the 
control of weapons rather than their proliferation is 
the only rational course to take, the phenomenon of an 
arms race can be explained only by some gross ignorance
2or neglect of the problem. The history of diplomacy in 
the twentieth century is described as a "history of 
lost opportunities. "2 The arms race today exists 
because of a "road not taken," as if there were a clear 
and easy choice between arms control and an arms race. 
Even the pitiful attempts that have been made in arms 
control are woefully inadequate because the limits are 
set too high and the restrictions only cover certain 
quantitative aspects of weapons arsenals, not 
technological advance, thus merely "institutionalizing" 
the arms race.^
The defects of this interpretation are many. For 
one, it is grossly simplistic. The decisions made to 
produce nuclear weapons and engage in arms races can't 
be explained primarily by some psychological 
abnormality or intellectual defect of political 
leaders. Nor can the explanation lie in the 
all-encompassing power of some "military-industrial 
complex." In fact, there are very rational reasons for 
producing weapons and engaging in arms races, and it is 
important to examine these. Equally important, any 
analysis of the failure of arms control must go deeper 
to get at the root causes and not the symptoms of the 
problem. That there were and are inadequate 
restrictions in arms control treaties is obvious; the 
question is, why?
Another view of the failure of arms control is
3that of the "diplomatic mechanics." According to this 
group, the problems of arms control are technical and 
can be "fixed" by a more skillfull and intensive 
diplomacy. While there are real differences between 
the superpowers, the major difficulty lies in their 
different "conceptions," "perceptions," "d€‘finitions," 
and "perspectives." The solution consists simply of a 
"redefinition," "a common framework," "further 
dialogue," and greater "understanding."^ Security 
policy should be based less on military strength to 
cover worst-case scenarios than on diplomatic therapy 
sessions between the superpowers:
If a fraction of the effort given to 
calculating technical deterrence requirements 
were devoted to raising political awareness 
of the perceptions of the other side, there 
might be a substantial increase in security 
foi both sides.*
This approach is also flawed. It avoids the real 
problems of U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control. 
Greater skill and expertise in diplomacy can have only 
a limited impact on the deep structural difficulties of 
U.S.-Soviet relations. Even assuming perfect 
diplomacy, a great deal of the security requirements of 
both sides are simply incompatible. There are elements 
of a zero-sum game involved which by definition cannot 
be resolved.
It is true that mutual misunderstanding can
4exacerbate relations; on the other hand it could be 
argued that misunderstanding was actually an impetus to 
detente by hiding the real differences between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. In other words, if Nixon had 
known at the beginning that detente would not preclude 
a growing threat to American land-based missiles and 
Soviet adventures in Angola and Afghanistan, and if 
Brezhnev had known that detente would mean public 
demands for better treatment of Jews in the U.S.S.R. 
and vehement American reactions against "progressive 
movements" in the Third World, then it is likely that 
detente would have never gotten off the ground.
Another explanation for the decline of arms 
control lays the blame primarily on the Reagan 
administration. In this view, there are two faults of 
the Reagan administration. One, it is too intransigent 
and offers only blatantly non-negotiable proposals to 
the Soviets. Two, President Reagan is uninformed and 
indecisive about arms control policy and allows 
bureaucratic conflict to sabotage any prospect of a 
unified policy.7
Both these criticisms have an element of truth, 
but they are wholly inadequate when used as an 
explanation for the sorry state of arms control. One 
must bear in mind that SALT was essentially doomed by 
the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan— before the 
Reagan administration came along. And the fact that
5ihe Reagan administration was elected is due in part to 
the failure of arms control to deliver all that was 
promised.
The criticism of an uninformed President and a 
divided arms control policy also falls short as an 
explanation; it makes the same mistake as the 
"mechanics” by assuming that greater tactical skill in 
policy-making can overcome deep structural problems. 
If a unified arms control policy were so important, 
then the problem could be easily solved by appointing 
Caspar Weinberger to the position of arms control czar; 
but one suspects that this would not exactly mollify 
the critics of the Reagan administration.
Misguided explanations for the failure of arms 
control are not limited to the left. The right often 
makes unfair accusations that the U.S. is consistently 
outmaneuvered in arms control negotiations, making 
concessions too easily and settling for poorly drafted, 
ambiguous agreements which the Soviets quickly 
exploit.® Not only does this ignore the years of 
painstaking efforts of American policy makers and 
diplomats to bargain from strength and nail down 
specifics, but it assumes that arms control 
negotiations have tremendous power and influence to 
shape the security of the U.S. In fact, the 
negotiating process in itself is only one small aspect 
of the problems of arms control and reflects reality to
6a greater extent than shapes it.
The actual causes of the decline of arms control 
are not difficult to discover; all that is needed is a 
more thorough analysis of the historical record. Thus, 
this study will examine the historical background of 
the SALT I negotiations and treaty. Potentially, any 
arms control attempt could be analyzed, but SALT I 
seems especially relevant, first, because it was the 
most far-reaching arms control effort yet attempted, 
and second, to show that the troubles which later 
rocked the entire arms control process did not suddenly 
appear out of nowhere, but in fact grew out of roots 
existing in the very period when the hopes for arms 
control were at their highest. This study will attempt 
to show that there were three main causes of the 
decline of arms control.
The first cause was the rejection of Mutual 
Assured Destruction as a strategic doctrine, in this 
case, primarily by the Soviets. While a war-winning 
strategy is not wholly incompatible with arms control, 
it exerts a destructive influence and prevents arms 
control from reaching its full potential. When Soviet 
doctrine translated itself into actual force 
deployments, it encouraged a shift in the U.S. away 
from MAD, accelerating the decline of arms control.
The second ceuee was the incoatpatibility between 
the American concept of "linkage" and the Soviet
7concept of "peaceful coexistence." For the Soviets it 
was only natural and inevitable that their "class 
struggle" with the U.S. continue even while efforts 
were made to bring about arms control and disarmament. 
The United States, however, insisted on linking arms 
control with overall relations, and even when the 
policy was abandoned, linkage remained a reality.
The third cause was the enormous difficulty of 
arriving at that elusive goal of true "parity." 
Although worst-case planning is frequently derided, 
ambiguities in the military balance and the inability 
to predict the future make worst-case planning a 
necessary tool of policy. Because of the zero-sum 
nature of American and Soviet security concerns, it is 
nearly impossible to arrive at a reliable parity.
As the previous paragraphs have probably already 
indicated, the tone of this study is rather 
pessimistic. However, this does not mean that the 
decline of arms control was an inevitable process. 
There is some scope for human action and the concluding 
chapter will examine the possibility of using 
historical lessons as a guide to present policy. The 
problems of arms control encountered so far are not 
entirely intractable. But it is essential to recognize 
that many sweeping changes will be necessary, some of 
which may not be in our power to bring about.
8Chapter One
In order to understand the problems of arms 
control, one must understand how those arms might be 
used. In other words, nuclear doctrine must precede 
nuclear arms control. Otherwise, any attempts at 
developing an arms control policy will become mired in 
confusion.
One theory which has been developed as to the role 
of nuclear weapons is Mutual Assured Destruction, or 
MAD, as it was coined by its critics.* It is partly a 
reflection of reality and partly a guide to action. It 
is also the nuclear doctrine which is most compatible 
with arms control. A war-winning doctrine, on the 
other hand, is rather hostile to arms control. To 
understand why this is so, it is necessary to 
understand what MAD is.
The "Mutual” in MAD is probably the most important 
component of the doctrine. It recognizes that there 
are two sides involved which are given equal 
consideration in determining security, unlike 
traditional military doctrine which seeks unilateral 
advantage in the pursuit of victory. Thus, MAD is well 
suited for diplomacy, which is in essence the search 
for mutual interests.
9"Assured” provides the guarantee of mutuality. 
This guarantee is partly a reality but also a 
conciously sought goal. It provides for almost any 
imaginable contingency or worst-case, and also seeks to 
reduce worst-case fears through such concepts as the 
survivability of retaliatory forces and stability. By 
providing such a guarantee of mutuality, MAD 
facilitates arms control.
"Destruction" of people and industry is the 
criterion for the use of nuclear weapons should war 
break out. By making the criterion of use as simple 
and direct as possible, MAD increases the chances for 
successful arms control. Only a relatively low number 
of weapons are needed, and some weapons, such as the 
ABM, are completely unnecessary or even harmful, except 
to preserve a retaliatory force. A force deployment 
based on MAD makes it clear to the other side that no 
unilateral advantage is being sought.
The main goal of MAD is the prevention of nuclear 
war. It does this quite simply by guaranteeing that 
the consequences of such a war will be tremendously 
devastating for both sides. MAD cannot be described as 
a military strategy, for once war breaks out, only 
quick and effective diplomacy has any hope of limiting 
damage; there are no military options. It is, however, 
a strategy, even if its goals are limited to war 
prevention. If fully implemented, MAD can lead to a
10
more stable strategic and political environment which 
will be more conducive to attempts at actual 
disarmament, instead of mere control. Such is the 
ideal.
In practice, few people accept "pure” MAD as a 
doctrine; there are many variations and options which 
can be added. Some nuclear weapons may be targeted at 
opposing military forces instead of population centers, 
in order to restore some rationality in a policy which 
might otherwise result in mindless slaughter. Civil 
defense measures may be taken, if not for a 
full-fledged war-fighting capability, then simply for 
humanitarian reasons. A limited ABM system might be 
deployed to protect against third-country threats. 
These additions can still allow for the possibility of 
mutual deterrence, if not pure MAD. But if too many 
modifications are made, the policy is transformed into 
a war-winning doctrine.
The implications of a war-winning doctrine for 
arms control are not good. The requirements of such a 
doctrine dictate a vast proliferation of weapons 
systems to destroy opposing military forces and 
directly defend the homeland. Such an attempt at 
unilateral advantage makes a very poor prospect for 
diplomacy. And the emphasis on military virtues such 
as secrecy# surprise# and preemption creates an 
acceleration of uncertainties and worst-case concerns
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which drive the competition even harder. But the 
prevention of an arms race is not the main goal of this 
doctrine anyway. The main objective of a war-winning 
doctrine is to limit damage to the state as much as 
possible should war break out.
Thus, there are two basic approaches to the 
problem of nuclear weapons. The doctrine of MAD aims 
primarily at war prevention. A war-winning doctrine 
aims at successful damage limitation. The proper 
choice is not necessarily obvious; the United States 
and the Soviet Union have each emphasized one approach 
over the other.
The Evolution of MAD in the United States
The man best known for the development of the MAD 
doctrine is Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of 
Defense for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
Initially, the objective of the U.S. in case of war wa*3 
"Assured Destruction." American nuclear superiority did 
not allow for mutuality. Nevertheless, by rejecting 
victory as an objective and aiming simply at a 
retaliatory force capable of destroying 50 percent of 
Soviet industry and 25 percent of the population, it 
set the stage for the future emergence of Mutual 
Assured Destruction. In fact, Robert McNamara saw this
12
prospect in a favorable light, arguing the benefits of 
a "stable balance of terror.
McNamara was by no means dogmatically commited to 
MAD. In order to provide an escape hatch in case war 
broke out, he toyed with the idea of aiming nuclear 
weapons only at military targets, and sparing as many 
Soviet civilians as possible. Concurrently, the Soviet 
leadership would be spared in order to communicate with 
them and keep the war limited.^ This was not really a 
war-winning doctrine; rather it looked like a mutual 
damage limitation strategy, or "MAD with a human face,” 
to put it somewhat facetiously. Nevertheless, the 
capabilities for such a targeting policy would come 
uncomfortably close (for the Soviets at least) to a 
war-winning strategy. After much criticism, McNamara 
downplayed the idea of military targeting and declared 
that a full preemptive capability was not a U.S. 
objective.4
Civil defense was another deviation from MAD which 
Kennedy and McNamara started with great enthusuiasm, 
but later downplayed because of the difficulties 
involved and the opposition it aroused. McNamara 
eventually came to place more and more emphasis on 
deterrence rather than damage limitation. He accepted 
a thin ABM defense reluctantly, only to protect against 
the small potential threat of the Chinese nuclear 
force.5
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Despite all the academic theories of limited war 
and McNamara's efforts to obtain operational plans for 
limited retaliatory options, bureaucratic rigidity 
hampered attempts at attaining more sophisticated 
plans.® The Nixon administration was intent on changing 
that. In his Foreign Policy Report to Congress, Nixon 
declared:
I must not be— and my successors must not 
be--limited to the indiscriminate mass 
destruction of enemy civilians as the sole 
possible response to challenges. This is 
especially so when that response involves the 
likelihood of t*i9 9«ring nuclear attacks on 
our population.
The revised doctrine was to be known as 
"sufficiency,” as part of an overall strategy of 
"realistic deterrence." The term "sufficiency" implied 
that there were no significant gains to be made by 
building ever greater numbers of nuclear weapons; this 
ammounted to a repudiation of Nixon's campaign promise 
of restoring "clear-cut military superiority."® Aside 
from the fact that there were to be "more 
comprehensive” plans for limited options, the 
fundamentals of McNamara's doctrine remained. The 
principle objectives of strategic sufficiency were 
listed as:
— Maintaining an adequate second-strike
14
capability to deter an all-out surprise 
attack on our strategic forces.
— Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union 
to strike the United States first in a 
crisis.
— Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the 
ability to cause considerably greater 
urban/industrial destruction than the United 
States could inflict on the Soviets in a 
nuclear war.
— Defending against damage from small attacks 
or accidental launches.
As matters turned out, the last objective was 
later dropped when the ABM system under development was 
switched to defend Minuteman sites in order tr protect 
retaliatory forces, not people.^
Thus, at the time of the first Strategic Arms 
limitation Talks, U.S. nuclear doctrine was an 
embellished version of MAD. Ideally, for the purposes 
of arms control it should have been pure MAD.11 
Nevertheless, most major aspects of the Nixon 
administration's doctrine were still compatible with 
arms control. While the forays into counter-force 
targeting and ABMs could be the start of a trend toward 
a war-winning doctrine, the emphasis on second-strike 
retaliation and mutual efforts to limit damage provided 
a favorable groundwork for diplomacy.
Interpreting Soviet Nuclear Doctrine
15
Comprehending U.S. nuclear doctrine is not very 
difficult. Governmental policy is usually public 
knowledge, and even private thoughts and actions tend 
to become public knowledge a short time later. 
Moreover, doctrine is rooted in national character and 
we are certainly well-equipped to understand our own 
national character. The proper interpretation of 
Soviet nuclear doctrine is a more difficult task.
As with all attempts to understand the Soviet 
Union, there is a notable lack of information about 
Soviet internal policy-making. The information which 
can be gathered must be subject to an analysis of 
whether it is propaganda, a widely accepted policy, or 
a dissenting view of a certain group or individual. 
Such an analysis can be skewed by the political bias of 
the investigator. The selective use of evidence can 
"prove” a preconceived notion, or the same evidence can 
lead to different interpretations. Academic debates 
bog down because of the debaters* tendency to talk past 
one another, refusing even to come to an agreed 
definition of the terms being tossed about in all the 
rhetoric. Finally, there is simply a lack of effort to 
gather relevant information from all possible sources.
Thus, current interpretations of Soviet doctrine 
differ widely. One side, which might be loosely 
characterized as the "hawks," is led by Richard Pipes,
16
Joseph D. Douglass Jr., and Harriet Fast Scott. On the 
other side, of course, are the "doves," led by David 
Holloway and Raymond Garthoff.12 The "hawks" assert 
that the Soviets view nuclear war in the traditional 
sense of strategy: the objective is victory, and the 
means of attaining it include superiority in armaments, 
surprise preemptive strikes, and the occupation of 
enemy territory, while defending the homeland. ° The 
"doves" counter that it is a mistake to take the Soviet 
collection of military writings as the main source of 
doctrine and that the Soviet leadership generally 
accepts mutual deterrence and parity.
Since there does not seem to be full agreement on 
the nature of Soviet nuclear doctrine and its impact on 
SALT I, a fresh approach is necessary. This approach 
will rest on an examination of four indicators of 
Soviet nuclear doctrine in the specific historical 
period of SALT I. The first source will be the 
voluminous collection of Soviet military w tings. 
Since, however, this may not reflect the entire range 
of views in the Soviet Union, there is a need for a 
second indicator: the internal political balance, that 
is, the relative weight of each of the different 
opinions in the Soviet leadership on nuclear doctrine. 
The third indicator will be the SALT I negotiating 
record; Soviet nuclear doctrine should reveal itself 
notably here. The fourth indicator will involve a look
17
at the forces built to fulfill Soviet nuclear doctrine 
and the degree of correspondence between these weapons 
and previous writings and statements. These forces 
should form a comprehensive record of the essence of 
Soviet nuclear doctrine at the time of SALT I.
The Doctrine of Soviet Military Writings During SALT I
Military thought is taken very seriously in the 
Soviet Union. Unlike the civilian-careerist education 
of officers in the U.S. military, Soviet officers are 
thoroughly drilled in military history and strategy in 
140 military schools and eighteen academies. Many 
books on military theory are printed, some in ove* 
25,000 copies.^  The classic work Voyennaya Strategiya 
(Military Strategy) appeared in three editions (1962, 
1963, 1968) for a total of 90,000 c o p i e s . I n  addition 
there are the open military periodicals Krasnoya Zvezda 
(Red Star) and Kommunist Vooruzhennukh Sil (Communist 
of the Armed Forces) . Finally, there is Voyennaya 
Mysl' (Military Thought), a journal restricted to the 
highest military and political leaders in the Soviet 
Union, which has come to our attention only through the 
efforts of the CIA.
Soviet strategists are generally contemptuous of 
the "bourgeois military theorists" of the West .
18
Journalist James Fallows describes an encounter with 
one Colonel Kulish:
In 1971 John Morse met Kulish at a dinner 
party in Washington. 'He was very calm and 
collected,' Morse says/ 'he answered 
everyone's questions very politely, until 
someone mentioned that American strategic 
thinking was not the best. He smiled at 
that. 'You are right,' he said. 'You 
Americans leave your strategic thinking to 
mathematicians and economists, and that's not 
good. ' Then the ocher guy made a slighting 
remark about Soviet strategy. Kulish got 
mad. He said, 'You Americans forget that for 
two hundred years you've been over here 
invulnerable to invasion. We've been invaded 
every twenty or thirty years for centuries, 
so we think about strategy. We have had one
hundred yeai-o.
While American "mathematicians and economists" 
have constructed elaborate theories of deterrence and 
limited war, Soviet strategists have tackled the 
problem of nuclear weapons with the traditional 
military approach This is not to say that they do not 
appreciate the enormous destructive power of nuclear 
weapons. In fact, they recognize that nuclear weapons 
have brought about a revolution in warfare. But this 
revolution does not make warfare obsolete; on the 
contrary, it makes warfare quicker, grander, more 
destructive, and more decisive:
institute about it for at least a
As a result of the rapid development of 
productive forces, science, and technology,
19
the resources for waging war have become so 
powerful that, from the purely military point 
of view, the possibilities for attaining the 
most decisive political goals by the use of 
armed conflict have grown immensely. 8
Soviet military writings indicate that a world war 
will lead to the complete destruction, not of the whole 
world, but of the capitalist system alone:
In its political and social essence a new 
world war will be a decisive armed clash 
between two opposed world social systems. 
This war will naturally end in victory for 
the progressive Communist social-economic 
system over the reactionary capitalist 
social-economic system* which is historically 
doomed to destruction.19
Despite the fact that the Soviets view victory as 
"inevitable," they feel there is no excuse for not 
adequately preparing for such a war. In fact, there 
must be immense efforts in every sphere to assure 
victory beforehand/ — These efforts must be directed at 
attaining superiority in the "economic, 
scientific-technical, sociopolitical, moral and 
military spheres."2  ^ However, the "correlation of 
forces," as the Soviets put it, is not only an 
important peacetime calculation, but a factor to be 
changed decisively to Soviet advantage in the first 
stages of war. In other words, in a conflict between 
two equal opponents, one side can suddenly attain a
20
decisive superiority if it seizes the initiative as 
soon as the war begins:
The main factor in accomplishing tasks for 
changing the correlation of forces to our 
advantage is the effective application of 
nuclear weapons, that is the obtaining of 
such values for parameters as can bring about 
the maximum correlation of forces after 
nuclear strikes.21
The Soviets write that the most effective way to 
seize the initiative and bring about a decisive change 
in the correlation of forces is the attainment of 
surprise. Whereas Western theorists write only of the 
need to prevent surprise, Soviet strategists emphasize 
the need both to prevent surprise of the Soviet Union 
and to achieve surprise against the West. There are 
several ways to accomplish this. One type of surprise 
is the development of a new type of weapon, which if 
deployed quickly enough, can demoralize the enemy and 
deprive him of protection from the new means of 
attack.22 Or surprise can be brought about by the use 
of secrecy: camouflage, disinformation, and
countermeasures against enemy warning systems can play 
a valuable role.2  ^ Finally, the advent of super-quick 
ballistic missiles provides the opportunity to achieve 
surprise by means of swiftness of attack.
The advantage of surprise, according to Soviet 
writings, must be exploited to the hilt, not simply
21
through the destruction of the opposing side's industry 
and population, but the destruction of the enemy*s 
capability to retaliate. The first target will 
probably be the command, control, and communications 
centers of the United States. Due to their short 
flight times, SLBMs can be valuable in hitting 
Washington D.C. and other centers. Anti-satellite 
weapons can help cripple the U.S. warning system. High 
altitude nuclear bursts emit an electro-magnetic pulse 
which can ruin sensitive electronic systems all over 
the United States. The*e i3 also the possibility of 
covert attacks by the KGB to throw the country into 
disarray.^ Modern industry, communications, and power 
centers are extremely centralized and vulnerable. 
Arkady Shevchenko, the highest ranking Soviet official 
ever to defect, describes an encounter with one KGB 
agent in the U.S.:
One Sunday at lunch on the New Jersey 
Palisades in the fall of 1965, he [the KGB 
agent] could not stop talking about New 
York's great blackout. 'All those shining 
towers, ' he said, gesturing at the Manhattan 
skyline, 'they look so strong, so tall, but 
they're just a house of cards. A few 
explosions in the right places and do 
svidaniya [goodbye]. We're only beginning to 
realize how vulnerable this country really 
is.*26
Minutes after the United States is paralyzed by 
such activities, the Soviets plan to destroy the
22
military forces of the West: "strategic aviation, 
ICBM's, IRBM* s, tactical bomber aviation, naval 
forces." Followup strikes will destroy facilities that 
survived the first strike. Afterwards, secondary 
targets can be attacked, such as industrial centers, 
military storage areas, and reserves.27
When the nuclear strikes are completed, the job is 
still far from finished. Ground forces are needed to 
defend the motherland as well as launch an offensive to 
clinch victory:
For final victory in this clearly-expressed 
class war it will be absolutely necessary to 
bring about the complete defeat of the 
enemy*3 armed forces, to deprive him of 
strategic bridgeheads, to liquidate his 
military bases, and to seize strategically 
important regions. Moreover, we must not 
allow enemy ground armies, air, and naval 
landing forces to invade the territories of 
the socialist countries. . . . All these and 
a number of other problems can be solved only 
by the Ground Troops in cooperation with the 
other services of the Armed Forces.28
Despite the attempts of the "bourgeois 
specialists" to absolutize nuclear weapons, in the 
Soviet view the utility of conventional weapons is the 
same, or even greater, in the nuclear age. Tanks will 
serve an especially essential role. After the nuclear 
strikes create huge gaps in the enemy's defenses, the 
mobile divisions can roll right through with the armor 
protecting the troops from some of the effects of heat,
23
blast, and radiation. With nuclear barrages occurring 
all around, there will be no "front lines.” Victory 
will go to the side which exploits opportunities the 
quickest: "Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the 
appearance of nuclear weapons not only failed to 
diminish, but on the contrary even strengthened the 
role of tanks in battle.
The idea of limited war appears rarely in Soviet 
military writings, and when it does, it is discussed in 
the context of unilateral plans for limiting nuclear 
strikes for the purpose of allowing troop movement, 
preventing organizational breakdown during the chaos, 
and protecting vital industrial and storage centers to 
be seized by advancing troops. The Soviets recognize 
the possibility of a purely conventional war, but 
usually only as a prelude to a nuclear war. In the 
conventional phase, Soviet forces are to advance deeply 
and put as much of NATO's nuclear capability out of 
commission as possible while bringing up its own 
nuclear strike forces secretly to deliver the final 
decisive blow later.^0 The Soviets remain very 
pessimistic about the possibility of keeping nuclear 
war limited through mutual agreement, whether tacit, or 
through intra-war diplomacy.
The only reliable method of limiting damage in 
case of nuclear war in the Soviet view is through one's 
own unilateral efforts. After a Soviet offensive has
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damaged the opposing nuclear forces in a preemptive 
strike, there are several ways to absorb the weakened 
retaliatory force. ABMs were initially looked upon 
with much enthusiasm in the U.S.S.R., but later 
difficulties led to the decision to sign the ABM ban 
with the U.S., and Marshal Grechko was forced to 
declare: "there are still no reliable defensive means 
[against nuclear weapons]."31 Nevertheless, there is 
still a burning desire to use "scientific-technical 
progress" to correct this deficiency; the Soviets have 
developed enough of a head start in operational ABMs to 
deploy a nation-wide system in two years after 
abrogation of the ABM accords.32 In the meantime, 
efforts continue in civil defense, and in air defense 
against the Western bombing forces.33
The concept of deterrence is not discussed very 
much in Soviet military writings. They consider the 
prevention of war as something that naturally follows 
from thorough preparation in war-fighting strategies. 
In their view, a world war will occur not through some 
miscalculation or destabilizing weapons system, but as 
a deliberate policy on the part of the "aggressive 
imperialists" to unleash such a war. There is only one 
way to prevent war, and that is through the further 
accumulation of Soviet military strength. The 
sophistication of deterrence theory in the Soviet Union 
could be summed up in one statement of Marsh? 1
25
Grechko1s:
The lessons of history teach that the 
stronger the alliance of peace-loving forces 
[read: Soviet forces and the not-so-voluntary 
alliance of the Warsaw Pact] and the greater 
their military might, the more stable is 
peace on earth and the more reliable is the 
guarantee of security for all the 
freedom-loving peoples. 4
Taken alone, perhaps this concept is not so 
ominous; it would seem to resemble the American idea of 
"peace through strength." But the Soviets have much 
more in mind. Since, in their view, war can begin only 
through the aggressive plans of the imperialists, it 
makes sense to use every means available to force 
concessions from them:
It is impossible to agrea with the view that 
disarmament can be achieved as a result of 
peaceful negotiations concerning this acute 
and difficult question by representatives of 
opposing social systems. Disarmament cannot 
be the result of any utopian 'calming* of the 
class political struggle in the international 
arena. Quite to the contrary, it can be 
achieved only as a result of the most active 
pressure on their governments by the 
revolutionary forces in the imperialist 
countries combined with the flexible and 
principled policy of the socialist camp. Any 
other concept about the path to the 
achievement of disarmament is an illusion.**5
Another Soviet commentator notes:
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The communist and 
capitalist countries 
masses to solve prer 
problems, to curb a 
preserve peace, c
rs* parties of 
mobilizing the 
foreign policy 
cs (sic) , to 
l o  strengthen 
These part ies’international security 
efforts are directed toward rallying the 
masses and toward ensuring that they are 
organized, socially concious, and activated.
Under contemporary conditions, when the 
forces of reaction ace trying to aggravate 
the international situation and threatening 
mankind with an annihilating war, the working 
class has a special responsibility for 
preserving peace. Through massive lobbying, 
it can have a substantial influence on the 
governments and parliaments of capitalist 
countries, thus disrupting the aggressive 
intrigues of the imperialist bourgeois. ®
In summary then, it is difficult to think of 
anything less compatible with arms control than the 
ideas expressed in Soviet military writings. However, 
these writings are not the only indicator of actual 
Soviet nuclear doctrine. There are others, and it is 
essential to examine them and discover whether there 
are significant modifications to the doctrine expressed 
in military writings or simply a reaffirmation of the 
concepts just reviewed above.
Soviet Nuclear Doctrine as a Result of the Internal 
Political Balance
Before I discuss the internal political debate 
over Soviet nuclear doctrine, I should point out that
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there is a school of thought in the United States, 
generally associated with the "hawk" label, which would 
regard such an attempt as pointless. In that view, the 
Soviet leadership is in general agreement over the 
proper nuclear doctrine and communicates this doctrine 
through its military writings. Therefore, an 
examination of Soviet military writings is all that is 
necessary to arrive at the correct interpretation of 
Soviet doctrine.37 There are significant arguments to 
support this view.
First, Soviet military writings do emphasize time 
and time again that doctrine is to be determined by the 
political leadership, since according to V. I. Lenin, 
"War is the continuation of politics by other means."3® 
The authoritative book Military Strategy by Marshal 
Sokolovsky explains:
Military doctrine is the expression of the 
accepted views of a state regarding the 
problems of political evaluation of future 
war, the state attitude toward war, a 
determination of the nature of future war, 
preparation of the country for war in the 
economic and moral sense, and regarding the 
problems of organization and preparation of 
armed forces, as well as of the methods of 
waging war. . . . The basic principles of
doctrine are determined by the political 
leadership of the state.39
Thus, some people claim that attempts by Western 
theorists to make a distinction between military and 
civilian thought in the U.S.S.R. are simply
28
unwarranted.
That such a distinction is impossible to make may 
be argued partly on the basis that there is no clear 
line between civilian and military careers in the 
U.S.S.R.; Soviet society is thoroughly militarized. 
Party officials usually have some sort of experience in 
military work. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, served 
during World War IX as Deputy Chief of the Political 
Directorate of the Southern Front and was later 
promoted to chief of the Political Department of the 
Fourth Ukrainian Front. After the war he helped in the 
development of long-range missiles.** In addition, all 
the senior Soviet military officers are members of the 
Party; they make up 10 percent of the Central 
Committee.
Any attempt by the military to develop a doctrine 
at odds with the wishes of the political leadership 
would be impossible, according to several analysts. 
The Party has strict control over the military through 
an institutional apparatus known as the Main Political 
Administration of the Soviet Army and Havy. The MPA 
consists of political officers who are completely 
integrated with the armed forces and lay down the Party 
line, watching carefully for any ideological 
deviations. In addition, they participate thoroughly 
in the formation of military policy. The Lenin 
Military-Political Academy functions as an MPA think
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tank. Military books and articles are often written by 
groups of military and political officers acting in 
cooperation. In fact, some of the most hawkish 
positions in the Soviet Union are held by officers of 
the MPA. As an additional control, military writings 
cannot be published independently/ all writings are 
subject to censorship by the Central Committee 
Propaganda Department.4^
There are many public statements by Party leaders 
and even military officers to the effect that the 
Soviet Union seeks only parity and does not believe a 
nuclear war is winnable. But this seeming difference 
of opinion, according to American Mhawks,M is actually 
only propaganda aimed at the West. The policy set 
forth in military writings is unchanged. As Richard 
Pipes puts it, if public Soviet announcements are taken 
at face value,
we would have to believe that Soviet troops 
invaded Afghanistan in order to expel 
'foreign interventionists,' that Solidarity 
is a product of the CIA, or that the Soviet 
submarine which wandered into Swedish waters 
did so because of a navigational error.44
Since SALT and detente, the Soviets have become 
more circumspect in the publication of their nuclear 
doctrine. Several American analysts have noticed that 
articles in the open military press are more "oblique"
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and "less informative" about military doctrine. The 
Soviets have apparently noticed the interest which 
Western researchers have taken in studying Soviet 
military writings.^
Finally, the "hawks" say, the Soviet military 
forces built in the 1970s and 1980s have corresponded 
very well with the doctrinal pronouncements of the 
1960s. The emphasis on heavy, accurate land-based 
missiles provides a useful tool for a preemptive 
strike. The investments made in air defense and civil 
defense are enormous, as is the conventional 
build-up.
The case of the "hawks" is a strong one. However, 
there is a great deal of evidence that there are 
significant differences over nuclear doctrine in the 
U.S.S.R. that are derived from different institutional 
approaches and divisions among individual leaders. The 
historical record shows that the Soviet ideal of 
unitary doctrinal formation does not work perfectly in 
practice. Military doctrine tends to be made more by 
the experts in the military than by a political 
leadership with less knowledge of military affairs and 
other pressing concerns to attend to. There is also 
considerable doubt about how well the MPA represents 
overall Party views and fulfills its function of 
controlling the military for the ends of the Party. 
Proving what the Soviet leaders really think is
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extremely difficult, but the frequency of statements 
within the U.S.S.R. contradicting Soviet military 
writings suggests that one should not casually dismiss 
them as mere propaganda.
Although the scope of this paper is limited to the 
period of SALT I, one must go back further in the 
history of the U.S.S.R. to see how military doctrine 
was shaped by internal political struggles. Roman 
Kolkowicz, in his book The Soviet Military and the 
Communist Party , has noted that the Party generally 
has a firm grip on the military during stable periods, 
but during times of crisis, the military plays a 
prominent role. One such crisis arose after the death 
of Joseph Stalin. Details are sketchy, but it seems 
that the military was used as an ally to help eliminate 
Beria, the feared chief of the secret police, leaving 
Malenkov and Khrushchev as the main contenders. When 
Malenkov began to speak about the need for greater 
investment in the area of consumer goods, Khrushchev 
quickly sided with the military and heavy 
industrialists and, with their help, was able to oust 
Malenkov and achieve the dominant position in the 
Soviet Union. The rise of the military during the 
succession crisis was indicated by a number of factors: 
the rapid rise of the World War II hero Marshal Zhukov, 
the promotion or rehabilitation of numerous other 
military officers, and the loosened grip of the Main
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Political Administration on the Army.*7 A particular 
example of the utility of the military as an ally can 
be seen by Zhukov's use of military transport to 
shuttle Khrushchev's cronies to Moscow in the middle of 
an attempt to oust Khrushchev.*®
As Khrushchev consolidated his power, however, the 
military's heyday was over. Zhukov was getting too big 
for his britches, so Khrushchev demoted him to 
obscurity. While Soviet military officers were 
developing the bellicose doctrine later expressed in 
Military Strategy , Khrushchev began to sound like a 
closet liberal: "the general trend is toward the 
reduction of tension in international relations"; 
"under present conditions war is no longer completely 
inevitable"; "modern means of waging war do not give 
any country the advantage of surprise attack." He 
directly contradicted the official military line by 
downgrading the importance of conventional forces and 
advocating a minimum deterrence posture.*®
Khrushchev evidently had a difficult time bending 
the military to his will, and succeeded in completely 
alienating his former supporters. It has been 
suspected that Khrushchev eventually came to place 
ballistic missiles in Cuba partly in response to 
critics of his relatively "soft" defense posture. Such 
a move, he may have thought, would bring increased 
military power while keeping budgetary allocations
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low.50 Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the end result was 
disastrous, and when added to his other failures, led 
to his ouster.
Khrushchev*s later reminiscences confirm that, 
while he let the military have its way when he needed 
them, he was opposed to high military expenditures and 
a war-winning nuclear doctrine. Contrary to the ideal 
of a unified political-military leadership, Khrushchev 
was rather critical of the military:
[L]eaders must be careful not to look at the 
world through the eyeglasses of the military. 
Otherwise, the picture will appear terribly 
gloomy; the government will start spending 
all its money and the best energies of its 
people on armaments--with the result that 
pretty soon the country will have lost its 
pants in the arms race. . . .  I’m not saying 
that there's any comparison between our 
military in the socialist countries and 
capitalist generals, but soldiers will be 
soldiers. They always want a bigger and 
stronger army. They always insist on having 
the latest weapons and on attaining 
quantitative as well as qualitative 
superiority over the enemy.51
The collective leadership that replaced Khrushchev 
in 1964 was more conservative and depended in part on 
the military support which Khrushchev lost. Brezhnev 
in particular had cultivated ties with Marshal Andrei 
Grechko and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov earlier in his 
career, and he apparently joined in a coalition of 
hardliners against a faltering group in the Party
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pressing for a greater concentration on the consumer 
goods sector of the economy. The consequences of this 
political coalition soon became clear. The military 
gained more independence in determining doctrine and 
received a larger share of the budget.^  Khrushchev 
lamented this shift in priorities during his last year: 
in retirement:
Now that I'm no longer active, I can't help 
noticing from my position as a pensioner that 
the economizing trend we started seems to 
have been reversed, that now money is being 
wasted on unnecessary items and categories, 
and that this new trend of military 
overspending is putting a pinch on some of 
thr more important, but still underfinanced, 
arec of our country's life.”
But Khrushchev no longer had any say in policy. 
The Brezhnev coalition was in charge. It is this 
leadership which will occupy the main attention of this 
study, since Soviet nuclear doctrine at the time of 
SALT I was the result of the combined views and 
influence of each of the groups and individuals 
composing the leadership. A detailed examination of 
each group follows.
Marshal Grechko and the Old Guard Military
The basic views of this group are well known,
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having been expressed in the writings examined above.
There are two other aspects of this group which are 
important: first, its influence on Soviet defense and
foreign policies; and second, its specific views on the
SALT process.
The military was not completely under the strict 
control of the Party as some analysts assert. It has 
been ergued by Edward Warner that the instrument of 
control, the Main Political Administration, was coopted 
by the military and used for its own ends instead of 
the Party's. Political officers were often recruited 
from the corps of young military officers and given the 
same education and training as military officers. The 
MPA, Warner believes, has become an integral part of 
the military establishment and shares its views to such 
an extent that it is questionable whether its main 
loyalty lies with the Party or the Army.^ 4
Marshal Grechko was an early protege of Leonid 
Brezhnev, but that was not the only source of the 
military's power. In the Czechoslovakian crisis of 
1968 and the war scare with China in 1969, the 
political leadership was forced to rely on a show of 
military muscle; this generally increased the prestige 
and influence of the Soviet military. In another case, 
it is rumored that Brezhnev was forced to appeal to 
Grechko for help in the middle of a leadership crisis. 
Supposedly, Brezhnev was attempting to attain more
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control of the Council of Ministers when he was 
suddenly attacked by the rest of the Politburo 
leadership. Consequently, Brezhnev tried to reaffirm 
his authority by attending a display of military 
exercises under Grechko.55
Arkady Shevchenko also speaks of the strong ties 
between Grechko and Brezhnev. He reports that Grechko 
often used his free access to Brezhnev to argue for a 
strong military build-up. Grechko also got into 
numerous disputes with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
that had to be moderated by Brezhnev and Dimitri 
Ustinov.56 By April of 1973, Grechko's rising influence 
was indicated by his promotion, along with Gromyko and 
KGB chief Yuri Andropov, to membership in the 
Politburo. It has been speculated that this was done 
to shore up Brezhnev's position against attacks by the 
Soviet opponents of detente;57 but Brezhnev would have 
to pay a price to retain Grechko's grudging support of 
detente.
That the military had substantial influence in the 
Soviet leadership is unquestionable. The question is, 
what was the military's opinion on the SALT process and 
how did it affect the negotiations? Unfortunately for 
Brezhnev, the military evidently tended to be most 
unfriendly to SALT and detente in general. Shevchenko 
describes Grechko as "apoplectic" and "violently 
opposed" to the idea of negotiations with the United
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States. Although he eventually came to accept SALT, he 
did much to stall the process and sabotage it.5®
The military's dislike of SALT was reflected in 
their writings. They could certainly not risk 
questioning Party policy by directly opposing SALT, so 
they usually ignored SALT in the military publications, 
or if they did mention it somewhat favorably, they 
added many qualifications as to the aggressive nature 
of imperialism, the need for vigilance, etc.59 Marshal 
Grechko in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State ignored 
SALT completely and merely cited the need for vigilance 
to coerce the aggressive imperialists into more 
peaceful policies.5® So it can be safely said that if 
the military was the only group in charge of arms 
control policy, there would have been no SALT. But of 
course, it wasn't.
Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry
Gromyko was the main counterpart to Grechko. 
Having been wise enough to cultivate Brezhnev's 
friendship on hunting trips in his earlier days, 
Gromyko became part of Brezhnev's trusted inner circle 
and probably had as much personal influence on Brezhnev 
as Grechko. Gromyko was sympathetic to the arms 
control process as part of a broader political
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relaxation of tensions.**1 He was joined in his 
coalition for arms control by the rest of the Foreign 
Ministry and the academics led by Georgii Arbatov.
When the SALT negotiations began, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vladimir Semenov headed the Soviet SALT 
delegation. Yet this was by no means an indication of 
the power of the Foreign Ministry in arms control 
negotiations. The military had evidently gone to great 
lengths to control the information on Soviet military 
programs, to the point where the Foreign Ministry had 
to rely on Western sources to obtain data on Soviet 
weaponry. According to Kissinger, even Gromyko had 
only "rudimentary" knowledge of Soviet military 
programs. in addition, the Foreign Ministry was 
discouraged greatly from offering specific proposals 
for arms control.^ The influence of other groups such 
as scientists and the scholars from Arbatov's Institute 
for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada was minimal or 
even irrelevant. Shevchenko states that Arbatov's 
views were not avidly sought by the Soviet leadership 
and that Arbatov was used mainly as a spokesman and 
propagandist for Soviet policy in the West.**
In the area of institutional power, the arms 
control coalition apparently had no chance against the 
entrenched Old Guard of the military. Not only did the 
military vastly outnumber the raat, but it had great 
influence as the muscle behind leadership successions
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and foreign policy crises. That SALT ever got off the 
ground was due to two factors. First, as mentioned 
above, Gromyko had substantial influence with Brezhnev 
and Brezhnev himself was strongly committed to detente.
Second, Gromyko was able to draw in another important 
group to his arms control coalition.
Ogarkov and the "New Generation" of Soldiers
One of Grechko's personal advisers was the Chief 
of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, noted by many for 
his sophistication and youth. During the 1969 crisis 
with China, while Grechko was advocating a massive 
nuclear barrage against the Chinese, Ogarkov rejected 
Grechko's plan and regarded even a surgical strike as 
too risky because of the dangers of world war. When 
the time came for Politburo consideration of SALT, 
Ogarkov was again more pragmatic and hinted that 
Grechko was rather "old-fashioned" in his thinking.^
Gromyko took note of the more sophisticated 
attitude of the new generation of officers and decided 
to turn it to his advantage. He knew that a SALT 
agreement could not come about without at least the 
tacit consent of the military, and decided to coopt the 
military in the arms control process. As he remarked 
to Shevchenko, "the more they know, the more contact 
they have with the Americans, the easier it will be to
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turn our soldiers into something more than just 
martinets.” In fact, he even tried to put in a military 
man as the head of the SALT delgation, but this was too 
much for Grechko, and the job went to the diplomat 
Semenov.
The new guard of the military was hardly dovish. 
Yet, it was less bellicose than its predecessors. 
Ogarkov noted that it was possible to increase Soviet 
security through arms control agreements under "certain 
conditions”; he was made the principal military adviser 
to the SALT delgation. Later, an officer of similiar 
views, General Nikolai Alekseiev, was to serve in this 
position. Both of them were committed to SALT in order 
to restrain American economic and technological 
strength and use the "breathing space" to catch up.^7 
Later, Ogarkov was to make favorable comments about 
ShLT in the Soviet military press.
Brezhnev and the Politburo
It has been noted by some analysts that one should 
not take Soviet military writings too seriously since 
"the ideas of military officers do not necessarily 
reflect the convictions of political leaders."^9 Though 
there is no doubt a great deal of truth in this 
statement, it is often put forward without any evidence
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or analysis of Soviet politics. This is partly 
forgivable, as it is nearly impossible to know what the 
Soviet leadership really thinks. Until some daring 
person manages to smuggle out the secret "Brezhnev 
papers,” there are only two indicators of the political 
leadership's opinion on nuclear doctrine: their public 
statements and an insider's account from a Soviet 
defector. These two sources, with a little guesswork, 
can provide a fair assessment of what was going on in 
the leadership's mind at the time of SALT.
Brezhnev's public statements seem to indicate a 
less bellicose doctrine than would be surmised by the 
"official” doctrine expressed in the Soviet strategic 
literature. At times, Brezhnev even seems to be an 
advocate of MAD:
it is a dangerous madness to try to defeat 
each other in the arms race and to count on 
victory in nuclear war. . . .
I shall add that only he who had decided 
to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in 
the hope of emerging a victor from it. No 
matter what might the attacker possesses, no 
matter what method of unleashing nuclear war 
he chooses, he will not attain his aims. 
Retribution will ensue ineluctably.70
In another statement he again contradicts the military 
view:
allegations that the Soviet Union is going 
beyond what is sufficient for defense, that
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it is striving for superiority in armaments 
are absurd and utterly unfounded.7*
Because the public forum is so often used by the 
Soviets for propaganda and disinformation, these 
statements should be approached with caution. Indeed, 
after Brezhnev declared the rejection of superiority as 
a goal, he loftily asserted "our country will never 
embark on the path of aggression and will never lift 
its sword against other peoples."7  ^ Given the situation 
in Afghanistan, one wonders whether any public 
statements by the Politburo are indicative of actual 
policy.
However, there is good reason to suppose that 
under all the rhetoric, Brezhnev did believe that 
nuclear war was unwinnable and that nuclear superiority 
was not a practical prospect. It is important to note 
the audience of Brezhnev's remarks. If he had said 
these things directly to a Western audience or included 
such remarks only in propaganda publications such as 
Whence the Threat to Peace? , then his sincerity would 
be questionable. But he was addressing primarily 
Soviet audiences, and by denying the ability of the 
Soviet Union to emerge victorious from a nuclear war, 
he was telling the Soviet people that there was no use 
trying to achieve nuclear superiority and no point in 
preparing to win an all-out war. This would definitely 
be the wrong approach to take if one wished to prepare
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for victory in case of nuclear war. If Brezhnev had 
merely wanted to score propaganda points, he cou1 ! have 
made vague declarations about the Soviet Union’s 
peaceful intentions. But he specifically declared 
nuclear war to be unwinnable and denied military 
superiority as a goal, thus undermining efforts at 
preparing the populace and army for victory. As Major 
General Bochkarev put it, in a critique of another 
commentator: "Surprising logic: to strengthen the 
morale of the troops on the basis of their recognition 
of the hopelessness of the struggle for which they are 
preparing.
Normally, it might seem that the statements of 
Brezhnev should be taken as the most authoritative 
indicator of Soviet nuclear doctrine; after all, he was 
the most powerful man in the Soviet Union during the 
SALT period. However, for a number of reasons, 
Brezhnev did not emulate Khrushchev’s interventionist 
style and did not shape nuclear doctrine along the 
lines of MAD. The reality is more complex.
Soviet Nuclear Doctrine as the Result of Group 
Compromise
As was pointed out previously, the military can be 
a significant factor in Soviet politics; this seemed to 
be especially the case in the Brezhnev era. As
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Brezhnev consolidated his power, he could have 
deliberately reduced the power of the military and 
attempted to control it in the manner of Khrushchev. 
However, the record indicates that he did not choose to 
do this. Perhaps he thought the risks were not worth 
the possible gain, or that his own power would be spt;nt 
somewhat by confronting the military, or maybe he still 
felt a great deal of personal loyalty to his old 
comrade-in-arms, Grechko. Whatever the reasons, the 
Soviet military still had the influence to shape a 
doctrine at odds with arms control.
Part of the problem was Brezhnev's lack of 
knowledge of military matters and lack of desire to 
know. This meant that his decisions on military 
procurement policy and arms control had to be based 
primarily on information and advice provided by the 
experts in the military. The military more or less set 
the agenda for SALT decisions. The Foreign Ministry 
under Gromyko could act as a counterweight, but its 
influence was limited by the fact that crucial 
information on Soviet military programs was monopolized 
by the military and guarded very jealously. In fact, 
the military had almost complete control over all 
aspects of strategic thought. Unlike the situation in 
the U.S., in the Soviet Union strategic policy is not 
influenced by academics nor determined by civilian 
administrators. There was no influential school of
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thought putting forth a theory of deterrence as an 
alternative to the policy offered by the military.
In addition, as Sovietologist Harry Gelman points 
out, the decision-making process of the Brezhnev regime 
must be considered as one of the factors in the decline 
of detente. The key objective of the Brezhnev 
leadership was consensus. Open debates were strictly 
forbidden; final decisions had to be acce pted 
unanimously, if reluctantly. The purpose of this type 
of process was to ensure that most power remained in 
the very upper circle of Soviet leadership. Open 
disagreements would show weakness and increase the 
power of lower echelon bureaucrats to take advantage of 
the disputes and carve out a greater role for 
themselves in policy.74 The consensus method had its 
roots in Lenin’s concept of "democratic centralism,” 
the outward show of unity as a means of protection from 
internal and external enemies. Its use by Brezhnev was 
confirmed by Geidar Aliev, who was promoted to the 
Politburo by Brezhnev in 1976:
Not a single decision of the Politburo in the 
period I have been a member was a case in 
which there was a majority vote with some 
against. We always found a way for joint, 
concentrated action.75
While Aliev was able to view the Politburo since 
1976 only, it is probably safe to say that this 
phenomenon applied to the earlier period of the
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Brezhnev regime as well.
The great flaw in this type of decision-making was 
that it did not resolve real disputes; it merely hid 
them, and problems eventually emerged in one form or 
the other. Brezhnev paid a price for his consensus on 
SALT and detente. In order to mollify the military, 
heavy industrialists, and Politburo hardliners, he 
carried out his detente policy along with a continued 
heavy military ouild* up and a hands-off attitude toward 
internal military affairs. While SALT I supposedly 
ratified parity, the 1976 Soviet Military Encyclopedia 
still called for military superiority.7  ^ It was not 
until 1979 that the Soviet Military Encyclopedia 
rejected the goal of superiority. Raymond Garthoff 
sees this in a somewhat positive light, arguing that 
the Brezhnev regime modified its military doctrine in 
keeping with detente.77 However, the changes that have 
taken place at the level of public pronouncements seem 
hardly indicative of a major shift of military 
attitudes and operational policy. In any event, the 
changes took place well after the historical period 
which this paper deals with.
The task of maintaining Brezhnev's consensus on 
detente sometimes came under strain. At one point in 
1973, reports filtered into the West that Brezhnev was 
assuring Bast European leaders that detente was only a 
tactic to achieve superiority over the West in twelve
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to fifteen years. The details of Brezhnev's comments 
are difficult to substantiate; he may not have meant 
military superiority specifically or set a deadline of 
twelve to fifteen years. Western analysts were split 
over the implications of these reports. Military 
commentators in the West stated that this was an 
indication of Soviet deviousness. Civilian 
commentators stated that Brezhnev's comments were meant 
to mollify Soviet and East European hardliners.7® 
Actually, the difference in interpretation is probably 
moot. Whether Brezhnev meant detente to be a screen 
for attaining superiority or was pushed unwillingly to 
such a stance is irrelevant for American policy. After 
all, Brezhnev had to eventually back up his statements 
with concrete actions. The consequences for the West 
would be the same.
Given the consensus style of Soviet 
decision-making, Soviet nuclear doctrine is best viewed 
as a hodge-podge of conflicting views which was never 
subject to open debate, and consequently never quite 
resolved. It could be summarized as follows:
The Soviet leaders were most skeptical about the 
prospect of emerging victorious from a nuclear war and 
explicitly rejected the idea that a world war could 
serve any useful political goal. In that sense, they 
accepted mutual deterrence as a reality. Arkady 
Shevchenko, certainly no friend of the Soviet regime,
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makes this point clear:
I have often been asked whether the Soviet 
Union would initiate a nuclear war against 
the United States. I know from numerous 
Soviet leaders, military and non-military 
alike, including members of the Politburo, 
that the answer to this question is an 
unequivocal no. . . . Soviet leaders are
convinced that their victory will come in the 
course of the development of human society. 
And if they can speed up the process with a 
few small, limited conventional wars, so much 
the better. . . .
As long as the United States* strategic 
nuclear deterrent is strong enough, nuclear 
war is something Soviet leaders might 
contemplate only in the most extreme 
circumstances, if the} were absolutely 
convinced that the country was in mortal 
peril and they could see no alternative. 
They consider the prospect of a worldwide 
nuclear war unthinkable, to be avoided at all 
costs, even at the expense of Soviet 
prestige. All Soviet leaders, the old as 
well as the new generation, understand 
perfectly that nuclear world war can bury 
both Communism and capitalism in the same 
grave.79
However, while accepting mutual deterrence as a 
reality, the Soviets did not conciously seek to make 
mutual deterrence as a goal of policy. There were 
strong pressures within the leadership, especially the 
military, to attempt to overcome the prospect of mutual 
deterrence by deploying weapons capable of knocking out 
the American military force in case of war. The 
Soviets knew that a high-confidence capability for 
winning a nuclear war would not be within Soviet grasp 
in the immediate future. However, by reaching for such
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a goal and approaching it over time, they raised a 
great deal of anxiety in the West.
The danger of Soviet doctrine was not that the 
Soviets might readily resort to nuclear war as a tool 
of policy. Rather, the main threat was that as the 
Soviet war-fighting capability grew, there would be a 
greater tendency to regard the initiation of nuclear 
war as a less undesirable option in times of crisis. 
Worse, if mutual deterrence eroded, the Soviet Union 
could afford to run more risks in its foreign policy 
and intimidate the West.
But of course, the main theme of this study is the 
impact of nuclear doctrine on arms control. So it 
would be best at this point to examine how Soviet 
nuclear doctrine revealed itself in the SALT I 
negotiations.
Soviet Nuclear Doctrine as Indicated by the SALT I 
Negotiating Record
The Soviets aimed for a number of objectives in 
the SALT I negotiations. First was the psychological 
need, difficult for the Americans to understand, to be 
regarded as the equal of the United States. Any 
agreement which was declared to be based on equality 
would come a long way in overcoming the Soviets9 
historical inferiority complex. Second, SALT was to 
ease fears of an unrestrained competition threatening
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security and wasting valuable resources. American 
technology and economic strength were particular 
concerns. Third, there were the possible benefits of 
getting Congress to cut military spending and attain ing 
the appearance of Soviet-American collusion at the 
expense of China and NATO.®0 The Soviets were partly 
successful in achieving the above objectives.
The Soviets, It seems clear, did not intend to 
make concessions at the bargaining table if they did 
not have to. Throughout the talks they would sometimes 
stall apparently in the hope that "peaceful forces" 
within the West would pressure the ruling circles to 
abandon weapons systems unilaterally or agree more 
quickly to a Soviet demand. A case in point was the 
American ABM system. In 1967, the Soviet position was 
that a ban on ABMs was the silliest thing they had ever 
heard of, since ABMs were only defensive weapons. But 
as the American ABM system revealed itself to be far 
superior to the Soviet system, the Soviets pushed hard 
for an agreement banning ABMs only. It took much 
prodding by the U.S. negotiators to link limitations on 
both defensive and offensive weapons.®1
Soviet negotiators would not make or accept any 
proposals which interfered with projected military 
programs. The head of the Soviet SALT delegation 
himself, Vladimir Semenov, admitted that the main 
purpose of the Foreign Ministry was to draw up
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proposals which did not interfere with Soviet military 
programs.®^ it could be said that the same procedure 
was followed by the American side. But when one 
considers that projected Soviet military plans 
outstripped American programs at that time, arms 
control could hardly be expected to ratify parity.
The influence of the Soviet military at the 
negotiations was felt in other ways. The obsession 
with secrecy was a noticeable factor. The Soviets went 
so far as to use American names to describe their own 
weapons because they didn’t want to let the U.S. learn 
the Soviet weapons terminology!®® Throughout the 
negotiations the Soviets refused to disclose the number 
of their missiles until the very end, and the American 
side was forced to rely on its own intelligence 
estimates.®4 The Soviet diplomats knew even less about 
their own military forces.®® Apparently the Soviet 
military was still concerned with the possible military 
advantages of retaining secrecy— and the disadvantages 
of losing it.
Brezhnev, while certainly able to get any kind of 
information from the military, did not know much more 
than the civilian delegation. At one point in the 
summit, he accepted the American request for a freeze 
on missile size, not knowing that Soviet programs were 
under way to expand missile sizes. This concession had 
to be later retracted by Soviet negotiators. As
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Kissinger put it, "It was the last time we encountered 
him [Brezhnev] in a SALT negotiation without 
advisors."88
Studying the overall Soviet negotiating record, 
one gets the impression that the talks were conducted 
not for bringing about a stable mutual deterrence, but 
in order to perform the role of the Soviet 
damage-limitation doctrine. The Soviets turned down an 
American proposal to make a mutual declaration of the 
desirability of retaining survivable nuclear forces on 
both sides, and the American side was forced to issue 
such a declaration unilaterally.87
A specific concern of the American delegation was 
the potential vulnerability of ICBMs, but the concept 
of crisis stability did not seem to concern the 
Soviets, nor did they seem particularly concerned about 
the wisdom of placing most of their own nuclear 
warheads on ICBMs. They argued that the U.S. would 
have other means of retaliation such as bombers and 
submarine-launched missiles.88 It was a good point, but 
ICBM vulnerability could be the first step in a process 
to make all U.S. forces vulnerable with Soviet advances 
in anti-submarine technology and air defense. If the 
Soviets were truly resigned to mutual deterrence, they 
would certainly not waste resources on weapons capable 
of destroying the entire American ICBM force.
Instead of working toward crisis stability (a
N
component of MAD), the Soviets aimed to limit any 
weapons capable of damaging the Soviet state. For 
example, they pressed for limitations on American 
strategic bombers and forward-based systems in Europe, 
despite American protests that these were not 
first-strike weapons.It seems likely, then, that the 
reason the more sophisticated officers in the Soviet 
military favored SALT was because they saw how the 
talks could contribute to a damage-limitation doctrine; 
instead of deploying more ICBMs and ABMs to destroy 
American weapons, they could achieve the same 
objectives by negotiating to prevent American weapons 
from being deployed.
The manner in which SALT decisions were made in 
the U.S.S.R. ensured this approach in the negotiations. 
Shevchenko reports that "all key decisions [on SALT] 
were made by the Politburo on the basis of 
recommendations by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Grechko, with 
the aid of their professional assistants."50 Because of 
che general ignorance of Brezhnev and the Politburo in 
technical military matters, they had to rely on advice 
primarily from the military. Gromyko and the Foreign 
Ministry were hampered by their lack of knowledge of 
. /let military programs and their lack of knowledge or 
interest in crisis stability and other aspects of 
deterrence theory widely discussed in the West. Henry 
Kissinger notes:
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Experience has shown that the Soviet 
bureaucracy may be structurally incapable of 
originating a creative SALT position. If 
Dobrynin was to be believed, each Soviet 
department was confined to issues in its 
jurisdiction. Thus the Foreign Ministry was 
not entitled to a view of strategic programs, 
which were within the competence of the 
Defense Ministry. Allegedly, the Defense 
Ministry could not comment on diplomatic 
proposals— though I had difficulty believing 
this when its head, first Andrei Grechko and 
then Dimitri Ustinov, was serving on the 
Politburo. In this view overall goals emerge 
from the Politburo or perhaps the General 
Secretary’s personal office. This, Dobrynin 
claimed, was easier to do in response to an 
American proposal than as a Soviet 
initiative; the Soviet bureaucracy is 
apparently no exception to the rule that no 
one likes to volunteer for the role of having 
proposed a concession. Thus, Soviet 
proposals tend to be formalistic and 
outrageously one-sided. I know no instance 
in which a breakthrough did not result from 
an American initiative.
Arms control in general did not seem especially 
important to the Soviets. Gerard Smith notes that 
while American negotiators seemed intent upon getting 
specifics and closing loopholes, the Soviets were 
mainly interested in attaining a broad political 
agreement setting forth vague principles. a major 
reason for this was to attain the benefit of lowered 
tensions (or at least the appearance of lowered 
tensions) while preserving Soviet freedom to maneuver. 
A case in point is the Soviet decision to sign a 
convention banning biological weapons. The military 
opposed such a step adamantly, but Gromyko wanted the
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treaty at least for propaganda purposes, so a 
compromise was reached: the treaty was signed, but 
without verification controls. Consequently, Grechko 
was able to assure the military thac it could safely 
continue developing biological weapons, while Moscow 
could receive credit for advancing the cause of 
disarmament.
Looking at Soviet attitudes toward other 
diplomatic agreements, the same phenomenon appears: the 
Soviets value broad statements of principle highly, 
while displaying less of an interest in specific arms 
control agreements. Brezhnev stated, much to 
Kissinger's surprise, that the Declaration on Basic 
Principles of Relations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States was even more important than SALT I. 
The Soviets valued the Basic Principles agreement 
highly because of the psychological need for being 
accepted as equals and also because the document 
recognized the Leninist concept of "peaceful 
coexistence" as the basis of relations between the two 
superpowers. To the more pragmatic American mind, 
such a declaration was not a very concrete 
accomplishment— SALT I was. The later Agreement on the 
Prevention of Nuclear War, described by Kissinger as a 
"somewhat banal statement that our objective was 
p e a c e , w a s  noted as an "important step" by Marshal 
Grechko in his book; he did not mention SALT I.96
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Thus, the Soviet negotiating record does not
indicate the acceptance of MAD. Soviet security was 
primarily dependent on other tools of policy. These 
to* Is arc the final indicator of Soviet nuclear
doctrine dur i.ng the SALT I period.
Soviet Nuclear Doctrine as Reflected in Their 
Deployment of Weapons
It is not within the scope of this paper to 
include an elaborate list of the numbers and types of 
Soviet weapons. The technical details are not so 
important as the general trend of Soviet deployments. 
For this purpose, it is necessary to jump slightly 
ahead of the SALT I period to examine the deployments 
which were planned beforehand.
The SALT I agreement had fairly strict 
quantitative restrictions/ however, qualitative changes 
through technology were definitely possible and could 
decisively shift the strategic balance by directing 
investment towards improvements in existing weapons. 
Soon after the SALT I treaty was signed, the Director 
of the CIA, James Schlesinger, detected a "veritable 
explosion” of military research and development in the 
Soviet Union— research which had been previously 
delayed until the treaty was completed.^7 The focus of 
the build-up was on warheads; with MIRV technology, 
many additional warheads could be added to existing
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missiles. American MIRV technology was ahead of the 
Soviets', but there was one problem. Soviet missiles, 
whether by chance or deliberate design, were huge and 
could carry many more warheads; this is known as the 
"throw-weight" factor.
With this advantage the Soviets were in a better 
initial position to develop a force useful for 
preemptive strikes. When the advances in MIRV 
technology and accuracy were added to a land-based 
force with the attributes of quick response and ease of 
coordination, the Soviets were able to achieve the 
capability of destroying nearly all U.S. land-based 
missiles.
That this proceeded according to previously set 
plans not amenable to negotiation is best demonstrated 
by the "heavy missile" issue of SALT I. While the 
treaty froze the number of missile silos, the Soviets 
could circumvent this barrier by replacing older 
missiles with new, heavier missiles able to carry more 
warheads. American negotiators tried to prevent this 
in a clause banning the introduction of heavy missiles. 
The Soviets agreed to this clause, but refused to 
include a specific definition of a heavy missile, 
despite American protests. Rather than end up with no 
agreement, the U.S. dropped the issue and later issued 
a unilateral definition of a heavy missile. As might 
be expected, the Soviets ignored the statement and
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began replacing their old missiles with heavier ones.^® 
Developing a survivable second-strike force was 
not as high a priority with the Soviets as it was with 
the United States. This may have been due to the 
emphasis in their military doctrine on striking first 
instead of holding back and losing the initiative. 
Whatever the reason, the Soviet bomber and submarine 
forces were never developed as fully as the land-based 
forces. By 1979, the total number of warheads on 
Soviet submarines was 1309 compared to the U.S. total 
of 5120. More importantly, Soviet subs were rather 
noisy and could be tracked. As for bomber-carried 
weapons, the Soviets had 260 while the U.S. had 1926.^ 
It was somewhat short-sighted of the Soviets to have 
placed a lower emphasis on survivable forces, but they 
have tried to deal with the problem lately by 
superhardening their silos and deploying a mobile 
missile system in Siberia.
There seems to be one major gap between Soviet 
military writings and force deployments, and this is in 
the area of ABMs. Given the emphasis on damage 
limitation in Soviet military theory, it appears to be 
contradictory for the Soviets to have pushed for a ban 
on the primary defensive weapon, the ABM. However, it 
has been suspected by some analysts that the Soviet 
acceptance of a ban on ABMs enabled them to pursue 
damage limitation more effectively than if ABMs were
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allowed to proliferate. In order co understand this, 
one must bear in mind that there is no essential 
difference between destroying enemy warheads in flight 
and destroying them while still on the ground. At the 
time of SALT I, the Soviet ABM system was running into 
problems and was no match for the superior American ABM 
system. However, a Soviet preemptive strike force 
could be much more effective at destroying American 
weapons as long as there was an ABM ban to ensure that 
a preemptive strike could get through. The assertion 
that the Soviets accepted MAD by agreeing to an ABM ban 
is the opposite of the truth.100
The Soviet interest in damage limitation is 
indicated also by their continuing heavy investment in 
air defense and civil defense. The Soviet air defense 
system continues to be the most extensively developed 
in the world. It includes hundreds of radars and MIG 
interceptors, and thousands of surface to air missiles 
(SAMs); future plans are for systems capable of 
intercepting the American B-l bombers and cruise 
missiles. The ability of this system to perform as 
planned in wartime is not clear; the Korean air liner 
incident has demonstrated considerable problems with 
the Soviet defense system.101 Nevertheless, it is much 
better than the U.S. air defense system, which was 
neglected after SALT and has degraded to the point 
where it is difficult to detect drug traffickers.
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Civil defense is another area of Soviet 
superiority. It has been estimated that civil defense 
preparation costs the U.S.S.R. two billion dollars per 
year and employs 100,000 people full time.102 
Nevertheless, while their civil defense system may be 
capable of protecting most of the leadership, given 
several hours warning, there is little capability to 
protect the entire population. And the possible 
long-term environmental effects of a nuclear war could 
render civil defense efforts useless anyway.
In sum, then, the Soviet force deployments which 
were planned before and during the SALT I process 
indicate a strong correlation with a damage limitation 
doctrine rather than a MAD doctrine. Several caveats 
need to be stated, however. Neither past nor present 
Soviet capabilities give very much assurance to the 
Soviet leadership that they will be able to emerge 
victorious in a nuclear war; this has already been 
noted by Arkady Shevchenko. The widely publicized 
"window of vulnerability" scenario has been exaggerated 
by some American analysts. There is little evidence 
that the Soviets have ever conceived of such a 
scenario; if anything, the existing evidence suggests 
that the Soviets are more pessimistic than the 
Americans about the possibility of successfully taking 
advantage of this "window," especially since the 
scenario requires mutual restraint and intra-war
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diplomacy in order to be viable.
Rather than a ’'window of vulnerability," the 
result of the Soviet military build-up is best 
described as a "foot-in-the-door" capability. The 
Soviets knew that threatening the American land-based 
deterrent would not be enough to provide adequate 
damage limitation. The hope was (especially in the 
military) that a preemptive strike capability against 
American ICBMs would be the first step in a process 
toward an effective damage limitation capability. 
After the attainment of this first step, they could 
make further progress in air defense and civil defense, 
while continuing research in ABM technology and 
anti-submarine technology. If they could combine 
future breakthroughs in these areas with Soviet peace 
offensives, the negotiated limitation of American 
systems, and a "deepening crisis of capitalism" (such 
as the Vietnam trauma), they might actually attain a 
strong damage limitation capability.
This interpretation of Soviet aims should not be 
mistaken for a Soviet "master plan" for attaining 
nuclear superiority. The Soviet drive for superiority 
stemmed not from a plan, but from a rather complex 
amalgamation of pressures from within the Soviet 
leadership and society. Whatever the cause, it resulted 
in a build-up directed toward a war-winning capability 
which had an injurious effect on the arms control
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process embodied in SALT.
Possible Objections to the Preceding Analysis of Soviet 
Nuclear Doctrine
There are two possible counter-arguments that can 
be made with respect to the preceding evaluation of 
Soviet nuclear doctrine and its impact on SALT I. 
First, some have asserted that there was little or no 
difference between American and Soviet nuclear 
doctrine, that there were approximately equal elements 
of war-fighting in both. If this is true, then the 
preceding analysis has been exceedingly unfair by 
concentrating on Soviet nuclear doctrine and not giving 
credence to the strong elements of damage limitation in 
American doctrine. Second, it has been argued that 
Soviet nuclear doctrine is irrelevant; there is no way 
to "win” a nuclear war, and nuclear superiority is 
meaningless. Each of these objections will be dealt 
with one at a time.
First Objection; Soviet and American Nuclear Doctrines 
Have Been Equivalent
The notion of doctrinal equivalence has been 
raised several times, but the most comprehensive 
version is in a booklet by Fred Kaplan entitled Mutual
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Delusions. The thrust of Mr. Kaplan's argument is as 
follows: Western analysts such as Pipes and Douglass 
have been biased in looking at Soviet military writings 
for indications of Soviet doctrine while dismissing the 
less aggressive statements by Brezhnev as propaganda. 
This bias is exacerbated by the fact that these same 
analysts treat public statements by American Presidents 
and Secretaries of Defense as the real doctrine while 
ignoring the "more arcane military manuals" of the U.S. 
armed forces. Of the plans for fighting and winning a 
nuclear war, Kaplan writes "this sort of tendency is a 
military tendency--and not a Soviet or an American 
one."^3
Kaplan attacks the idea that American nuclear 
doctrine has been based on MAD. He cites McNamara's 
advocacy of military targeting which was later 
translated into operational plans. These plans have 
never consisted of a simple retaliatory spasm aimed 
only at civilian centers. Kaplan also uses numerous 
quotations from U.S. Army tactical nuclear war manuals 
on the need to fight and win with nuclear weapons. 
Finally, he concludes: "In the business of fighting and 
winning nuclear wars, the Soviets and the Americans are 
equally susceptible to the dangers of self- 
delusion .
The problem with Kaplan's analysis is that in 
trying to correct the view that military writings are
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the only source of Soviet doctrine, he goes to the 
other extreme and simplistically argues that American 
and Soviet doctrine are mirror images of each other. 
There is a good deal of truth in the assertion that it 
is a military tendency (Soviet and American) to develop 
strategies for fighting and winning a nuclear war. One 
can easily cite evidence demonstrating the elements of 
war-fighting which have existed in American nuclear 
doctrine. But such an analysis proves little if it is 
not accompanied by an attempt to quantify the 
prevalence of war-fighting elements in strategic 
doctrine, as this study has done with Soviet nuclear 
doctrine. The fact is that damage limitation has 
always occupied a much more prominent place in Soviet 
doctrine than American doctrine.
The notion of doctrinal equivalence assumes that 
the power of the military as an institution and the 
influence of military thought has been approximately 
the same in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This is 
clearly not the case. The military in the Soviet Union 
has played a powerful role in past succession crises 
and has been used by the political leadership as a 
means of support. The same cannot be said of the U.S. 
military. The extent of military thought in both 
countries has Also been unequal. The U.S. Defense 
Department is pervaded by civilian analysts who often 
have more influence on the Secretary of Defense than
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professional military officers.1®4 Evidence of this 
influence has been demonstrated by the Defense 
Department's rejection in 1971 of a Congressional 
proposal to increase the accuracy of the Minuteman 
missiles.1®*^ Moreover, there is a substantial body of 
civilian thinkers in the U.S. who had previously 
developed theories of deterrence and arms control and 
later came to work for the U.S. government (Henry 
Kissinger for one). The Soviet Ministry of Defense 
consists almost entirely of military officers, and 
there is no influential civilian school of strategic 
thought in the Soviet Union.1®7 It is not fair for Mr. 
Kaplan to imply that Brezhnev's public statements are 
just as valid as the annual posture reports of the 
American Secretary of Defense. The American Defense 
Secretary participates actively in the formation of 
doctrine, whereas Brezhnev, for whatever reason, did 
not choose to interfere extensively in the military 
sphere.
Even assuming that the influence of the military 
has been equal in both countries, it seems to be 
characteristic of Soviet society as a whole to reject 
MAD in favor of a damage limitation doctrine. This 
characteristic is rooted in the profoundly pessimistic 
view that the threat of mass destruction is not 
reliable for the prevention of war. Consider the views 
of the Soviet General Talensky, who has been widely
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regarded by Western analysts as an opponent of 
war-winning doctrines and a supporter of a minimum 
deterrence posture.*1® In an article in International 
Affairs, he argued strongly for ABMs, stating:
After all, when the security of a state is 
based only on mutual deterrence with the aid 
of powerful nuclear rockets, it is directly 
dependent on the goodwill and designs of the 
other side.1®^
Apparently the prospect of massive destruction 
for the United States is not enough to deter the 
Americans/ there must be goodwill as well, and this 
cannot be reliably forthcoming from the capitalists.
Georgi Arbatov has also been widely identified as 
a civilian "pragmatist,” arguing against the idea of a 
winnable nuclear war and for lower military spending 
and detente.11® What does he think of deterrence?: "The 
concept of deterrence itself cannot be defended— it is 
a concept of 'peace built on terror,' which will always 
be an unstable and a bad peace."111 Contrast this with 
Nixon's view that a "balance of terror" gives each side 
"an ultimate interest in preventing a war."11^
The Soviet rejection of a stable balance of terror 
is indicated also in the SALT I negotiating record. It 
seems that the Soviet delegation could not understand 
how one could be against his own defensive weapons. 
The diplomat Semenov thought the debate in the United
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States over the ABM system was over which cities should 
have the privilege of being defended; actually, the 
debate was over which cities should be saddled with the 
burden of having a weapons complex next door!11^
Thus, the evidence does not support the assertion 
that there has existed a mirror-imaging of nuclear 
doctrine between the superpowers. The notion of 
doctrinal equivalence has more credibility at present 
with the Reagan administration’s "countervailing" 
doctrine, but: the evolution of U.S. doctrine throucihout 
the 1970s and 1980s away from MAD must be understood as 
a series of reactions (and overreactions) to a Soviet 
military build-up revealing a doctrine not in 
accordance with American expectations.
Second Objection: Nuclear Doctrine is Irrelevant
A second objection often made is that it does not 
matter what the Soviets think or say, since nuclear war 
is inherently unwinnable and superiority is 
meaningless. Many have argued that only a small number 
of nuclear weapons is needed to fulfill the role cf 
deterrence, and any attempt to assign a military value 
to such weapons is an illusion. In their view, MAD is 
not a doctrinal option but a fact.114 Leon Weiseltier 
has argued:
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There is a sense in which ’Soviet* strategy 
is like * Soviet* genetics. The United States 
would be as foolish to believe that the 
numbers any longer matter, or that a nuclear 
war can be won, as it would be to believe 
that winter wheat will grow in the spring. 
The strategy is determined by the weapon. 
The missiles have only to exist, and 
deterrence is the law of their existence.1*5
In a similiar 
American negotiator 
nuclear doctrine:
vein, Paul Warnke, the chief 
for SALT II, has said of Soviet
In my view, this kind of thinking is on a 
level of abstraction which is unrealistic. 
It seems to me that instead of talking in 
those terms, which would indulge in what I 
regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet 
nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to 
educate them into the real world of strategic 
nuclear weapons^ which is that nobody could 
possibly win.11^
There are two possible rebuttals to this point of 
view. It could be argued that even if the idea of 
victory in a nuclear war were absurd, if one is dealing 
with an irrational opponent, one must appear just as 
irrational in order to deter him. In other words, the 
United States must have the same irrational military 
posture in order to prevent war. Educating the Soviets 
is not likely to work— after all, we*ve argued for 
years that democratic-capitalism is a better system 
than communism, but they still haven’t listened.
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However, it will be argued here instead that there 
is in fact a good deal of rationality in Soviet 
military doctrine. This position may seem difficult to 
support, for it requires that one demonstrate that it 
is possible to win a nuclear war. Actually, this 
position is not very difficult to support. The 
approach I will take here is in accordance with the old 
dictum that the easiest way to get someone to accept an 
idea is to persuade him that it is his own idea. 
Specifically, I will argue that those who deny the 
military value of nuclear weapons or the usefulness of 
nuclear superiority are actually of the view that it is 
possible to win a nuclear war.
Consider the views of the Swedish disarmament 
proponent Alva Myrdal. In some parts of her book she 
argues that "both sides have had more than enough for 
two decades" and that increasing military force is 
"ridiculously irrelevant." But in another part she 
argues that the American deployment of "Eurostrategic 
weapons" (Pershing and cruise) will be such a threat 
that the Soviets may immediately respond to remove the 
danger, even by launching a preemptive a t t a c k ! T h e r e  
is obviously a great deal of intellectual confusion 
here. Are increasing numbers of nuclear weapons 
irrelevant or a threat? Alva Myrdal's unarticulated 
views are probably that as long as the superpowers 
continue to compete in a nuclear build-up, the
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increasing numbers of weapons cancel each other out and 
make the increase pointless. But this is conditional 
upon the existence of an approximately equal 
competition between the superpowers; if one side 
decides to drop out or fall behind, the other side will 
gain meaningful superiority by deploying more and more 
first-strike weapons.
A related issue is that of arms control. The same 
people who argue that there is no military use for 
nuclear weapons and that both sides have more than 
enough are strong advocates of arms control or a 
nuclear freeze. But there is a contradiction in this 
kind of thinking. If building more and more weapons 
makes no difference, then there is no need for 
negotiated treaties to limit such arms. The U.S. can 
merely stop building such weapons, or even reduce to a 
"minimum deterrent" and let the Soviets foolishly waste 
money on a massive nuclear build-up. Since, however, 
anti-nuclear groups are most reluctant to advocate a 
unilateral freeze or unilateral reductions, it seems to 
show that they know subconciously that there is 
something more to an arms race than merely a mindless 
accumulation of unnecessary weapons.
There is also much confusion over the utility of 
"first-strikes." Many people dismiss the Soviet threat 
and argue that a first strike by either side would be 
suicidal because there would still be more than enough
71
weapons by the defender to make a devastating 
retaliation. Carl Sagan has gone so far as to say 
that, because of the effects of nuclear winter, a 
first-strike by either side would be suicide even if 
the other side did not retaliate.*1® However, these 
same people often argue that the first-strike weapons 
each side has now are destabilizing because they force 
the superpowers into a posture of "use them or lose 
them" should a crisis develop. But how can there be an 
incentive to strike first if it guarantees suicide? 
The only incentive to strike first comes from the 
possibility that one side will be able to destroy all 
or most of the other side's weapons and thereby 
significantly limit damage to the homeland. Once the 
possibility of successful damage limitation through a 
first-strike is admitted, then it follows that Soviet 
doctrine is not so irrational after all, that there is 
a military utility for nuclear weapons.
Consider the views of the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, a liberal anti-military lobbying group. 
For years they have argued that nuclear war is 
inherently unwinnable. But lately, the former head of 
UCS, Daniel Ford, has come out with a book claiming 
that both 8ides' leadership and communications systems 
are so vulnerable to nuclear weapons that a first 
strike against one side could render it incapable of 
rdering a retaliatory strike. Consequently, he fears
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that the U.S. will feel pressured to launch first in a 
crisis situation. * So here the former head of the 
Union of Concerned Scientists is arguing not only that 
it is possible to win a nuclear war, but that it is 
possible to emerge from such a war unscathed.
Of course, there are many fearful uncertainties 
connected with carrying off such a plan. I am not 
arguing that there is a good or even moderate chance 
that either superpower can win a nuclear war. My point 
is that since no one can be sure what the outcome of a 
nuclear war or a new weapons deployment will be, it is 
folly to assert dogmatically that a war-winning 
doctrine is irrelevant, just as it is folly to assert 
that a nucleiir war can be reliably limited or 
guaranteed of a victorious outcome. Nuclear doctrine 
is an immensely important factor, and it is essential 
to know what Soviet nuclear doctrine is. Even if the 
chances of a successful first strike are small, we must 
know whether such a threat will increase in the future 
and we must know how to cover for possible contigencies 
so that our deterrent is the most reliaole one 
possible.
Conclusion to Chapter One
The historical record indicates that one of the
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main causes of the decline of arms control was the 
doctrine developed by the Soviets before SALT and held 
by them throughout the process. While the First 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty seemed a resounding 
success at the time, there was considerable turmoil 
beneath the surface of detente.
The U.S. was not completely aware of this turmoil 
and how it might emerge in the future to threaten to 
wipe out the accomplishments of SALT I. Journalist 
John Newhouse raised the hope that SALT could be the 
start of a new Congress of Vienna. He completely 
ignored the implications of a Soviet damage limitation 
doctrine, at one point assserting that the Soviets 
built up their forces without a formal strategic 
doctrine and elsewhere noting that the Soviets finally 
accepted MAD in SALT I.12  ^ Richard Nixon, Henry 
Kissinger, and Gerard Smith have not made a single 
mention of Soviet nuclear doctrine in their memoirs. 
They apparently proceeded from the assumption that the 
Soviets had approximately the same views as they did on 
the nuclear problem.
That the Soviets did not think the same way became 
clear when their military build-up translated doctrine 
into reality. Only then came an American response. A 
long-standing Congressional policy to refuse budgetary 
requests for developing more accurate missiles was 
finally dropped in 1974 as the implications of the
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growing Soviet war-fighting capability becan.e 
noticed.*21 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
argued that such improvements in accuracy were 
necessary in order to provide targeting flexibility; 
once the Soviets acquired a counter-force capability, 
the U.S. had to have the capability to respond to 
limited strikes on the same level. *22 Thus did U.S. 
nuclear doctrine shift further away from MAD.
On the diplomatic front, the Nixon administration 
attempted to reduce the prospect of Minuteman 
vulnerability through limitations on throw-weight and 
the number of warheads. But as Nixon put it, the 
Soviets "stonewalled us."*^3 Kissinger felt continually 
beleaguered by demands from the American right to 
obtain an agreement with "equal aggregates," that is, 
approximately equal numbers and slmiliar 
characteristics of weapons on both sides. In his view 
(proved correct by later events), it was pointless to 
expect to achieve exactly equal forces through 
negotiations when unilateral American build-ups were 
not aiming for such a goal . The best he felt he could 
do was push the Soviet preemptive capability as far 
into the future as possible; the Soviets simply had 
more "bargaining chips."124 prom then on, i became 
increasingly clear that the SALT process could not 
achieve its ultimate goal to stabilize the strategic 
balance along MAD lines.
Instead, MAD was left behind in favor of a shift 
toward a war-fighting doctrine. In the late 1.970s, the 
Carter administration developed the "countervailing" 
doctrine, emphasizing the targeting of Soviet military 
capabilities and leadership. Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown described the goal of this doctrine "to 
make a Soviet victory as improbable (seen through 
Soviet eyes) as we can make it, over the broadest 
possible range of scenarios."125
Soviet military writings suddenly received great 
interest in the U.S., after a long period of neglect. 
Richard Nixon finally recognized Soviet nuclear 
doctrine in his 1980 book The Real War. Unfortunately, 
there was a good deal of overreaction to Soviet 
doctrine as well. Too much emphasis was placed on 
military writings as the sole source of doctrine. 
Soviet desires for a war-winning capability were 
mistaken for actual capability. The "window of 
vulnerability" concept in particular was exaggerated; 
the Soviets had no confidence that such an imbalance 
could provide immediate decisive results.
When the Reagan administration came into office, 
it developed the countervailing doctrine further and 
abandoned the traditional SALT process in favor of 
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The START 
proposal was based on the previous proposals from the 
right-wing critics of Kissinger. It called for deep
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reductions leading to forces approximately equal in 
launchers, warheads, and throw-weight. Because it
attempted to rectify the f r t egi<: I n 1 u i; * I y /’lift i nq 
deeply into Soviet eupub ii.it ins while allowing Atfie H  can 
d e ployments, it w a n r e ject ed b y Me Soviets. 
Eventually, the Reagan administration came to seek 
salvation from the nuclear problem through a "Strategic 
Defense Initiative." Arms control Jay in shambles.
Unfortunately, there continue to be misguided 
explanations for the decline of arms control. The 
failure of SALT has been attributed to the failure to 
do enough, because of the lack of political 
intelligence and will to control technological advance. 
Specifically, the myth persists that the Nixon 
administration bears the primary responsibility for 
allowing American land-based missiles to become 
vulnerable to a first strike because it did not pursue 
a ban on MIRVs. It is true that Nixon and Kissinger 
did not push hard for such a ban, and that this was a 
mistake. But to claim that this was "one of the worst 
mistakes ever made in American d i p l o m a c y or another 
"lost opportunity" to stop the arms race is a gross 
misinterpretation. It ignores the effect of nuclear 
doctrine on arms control.
As has been demonstrated in this study, Soviet 
nuclear doctrine in the early 1970s tended heavily 
toward one of damage limitation through the traditional
military method of the destruction of the opposing 
forces. The Soviets could accept an ABM ban, and in
fact desired it, because it would close off an area of 
American superiority and allow the Soviets to knock out 
more of the American nuclear force than if ABMs hid 
been al 11 owed to proliferate. A ban on MIRVs as well 
would have eliminated any chance at all for adequate 
damage limitation. That this was not acceptable to the 
Soviets can be seen by their continual rejection of 
post-SALT 1 American proposals to strictly limit the 
number of warheads and throw-weight. . There was never a 
o n c e - i n - a - l i f e t i m e  c h a n c e  to p r e v e n t  the 
destabilization of the strategic balance. The 
precondition for a MAD posture is a MAD doctrine on 
both sides; arms control negotiations reflect doctrine, 
not shape it.
An incompatible doctrine was not the only cause of 
the decline of arms control. There were deleterious 
effects on the SALT process from the international 
political environment. Whether by policy or reality, 
the geopolitical situation exerted a major influence. 
A discussion of its impact on arms control is the 
subject of Chapter Two.
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Chapter Two
As the preceding chapter has shown, one cannot 
study nuclear arms control in isolation from the 
doctrine formulated for the use of nuclear weapons. 
But it is also a fact that one cannot understand arms 
control in isolation from the geopolitical environment. 
The American term for the connections between arms 
control and overall relations between the superpowers 
is "linkage." The term was developed by the Nixon 
administration to denote a policy whereby all the 
strands of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, including arms 
control, were to be tied together in a web of 
relations. But linkage was more than a policy— as 
Nixon and Kissinger pointed out, it was also a reality, 
no matter how hard one tried to reject it as a policy. 
The linkage of political issues with arms control 
clashed with the Soviet concept of "peaceful 
coexistence" and contributed to the decline of arms 
control.
The American Concept of Linkage
For Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, linkage in
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diplomacy was essential as a bargaining tool. They 
felt it was necessary to bring American areas of 
advantage to bear upon the Soviets to counterbalance 
areas of relative American weakness. In Nixon's view, 
the Soviets desired above all else the good public 
relations from a summit .eeting, economic cooperation 
with the U.S., and a SALT agreement. The U.S. wanted 
mainly a settlement in Vietnam, Soviet restraint in the 
Middle East, and a Berlin agreement.1 According to 
Nixon, to take the pragmatic approach and negotiate 
those agreements which seemed to be easiest to reach 
first would leave the U.S. with less than enough 
bargaining leverage to reach fair settlements in the 
areas of American concern. It would have been a 
one-sided detente. As Kissinger put it:
We proceeded from the premise that to 
separate issues into distinct compartments 
would encourage the Soviet leaders to believe 
that they could use cooperation in one area 
as a safety valve while striving for 
unilateral advantages elsewhere.2
Consequently, the Nixon administration linked arms 
control to overall political relations. But there was 
to be linkage within arms control as well. 
Specifically, the control of defensive weapons (ABMs) 
had to be linked with limitations on offensive weapons. 
At the beginning of SALT, the U.S. had an ABM system
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which outclassed the Soviet system, while the Soviets 
had a growing lead in offensive systems. The pragmatic 
approach put forth at the time involved negotiating one 
package at a time/ an ABM ban first, because it would 
be easier to reach with the Soviets. However, the 
prospects for real arms control would then be reduced, 
for the Soviets would have little incentive to limit 
offensive systems once the ABM ban was agreed to.
Nixon and Kissinger conceived of linkage as more 
than an essential bargaining tool— linkage was also a 
reality. It is this second aspect of linkage which 
Kissinger considers the most important:
significant changes of policy or behavior in 
one region or on one issue inevitably affect 
other and wider concerns. . . .  It is 
inherent in the real world. The 
interrelationship of our interests, across 
issues and boundaries, exists regardless of 
the accidents of time or personality; it is 
not a matter of decision or will but of 
reality.
Kissinger emphasizes that despite the American 
traditions of pragmatism, bureaucratic compartment- 
alization, and academic specialization, the 
interrelationships of world politics must necessarily 
be dealt with on a broad conceptual basis.^
Nixon asserts that arms control is not something 
that can be dealt with on its own merits. In his view, 
it is folly to think that one should temporarily ignore
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political differences in order to pursue arms control. 
It is not the existence of weapons which causes war, 
after ail, but political differences. Nixon summarizes 
his philosophy:
Trade and arms control must be linked with 
the settlement of political differences if 
the danger of war is to be reduced. Only if 
we use linkage in this way will we be 
attacking the root causes of war.
There is much to be said for this approach to 
foreign policy and arms control in particular. 
However, as a later section in this chapter will 
demonstrate, the history of linkage in SALT I did not 
always conform with Nixon-Kissinger ideals# and there 
wa3 a major flaw in the way the administration used 
linkage with arms control.
The Soviet Concept of "Peaceful Coexistence"
This study has already shown how Soviet nuclear 
doctrine was consistently ignored or dismissed by the 
U.S. until Soviet plans began to be translated into 
operational weapons. But it was not only the Soviet 
concept of war which was profoundly different; the 
Soviet concept of peace was also different# reflecting 
a different ideology# history# and political system.
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In the Soviet view, a real absence of conflict can 
come about only when class differences have been 
eliminated, that is, when world-wide socialism has been 
achieved. That is the ideological component. The 
historical component is the enduring legacy of paranoia 
and insecurity which can be remedied only by the 
overwhelming superiority of the Soviet state/ it has 
often been said that the Soviets search for absolute 
security, leaving absolute insecurity for everyone 
else. The Soviet political system, being based on 
"democratic centralism” and hostile to deviations from 
the Party line, also helps to ensure that the Soviet 
ideal of peace is not the Western concept of a 
pluralism of different states, but a world controlled 
primarily by the Party leadership. Paul Nitze 
describes his impression of the Soviet version of 
peace, ”mir," from the 1955 Geneva summit:
Ambassador Bohlen took me to a session of the 
Supreme Soviet, at which Khrushchev and 
Bulganin were reporting on the "Spirit of 
Geneva," as the Western press had christened 
the apparent spirit of cooperation that 
resulted from that summit conference. 
Khrushchev and Bulganin took turns in making 
the presentation. As Bohlen translated for 
me, I found it fascinating to watch the faces 
of the delegates and their reactions to what 
was said. Whenever the speakers dwelled on 
the Geneva conference, its apparent success, 
and the "Spirit of Geneva," the audience was 
dead; people yawned, and some actually fell 
asleep. Whenever Khrushchev or Bulganin 
launched into an impassioned description of 
Western faults, errors and shortcomings, the 
necessity for mlr, and the actions the party
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proposed to take to achieve mir, the audience 
became animated and broke into loud applause.
I asked Bohlen for an explanation of this 
apparently contradictory behavior. He said 
that the primary dictionary meaning of mir 
was "the world and those who live on it" and 
that "concord among peoples and nations and 
absence of war” was only the secondary 
meaning. He explained that, as the Soviets 
used the word in Party statements and 
writings, it meant a condition in the world 
in which socialism, the first stage of 
communism, had triumphed worldwide, class 
tensions had thus been removed, and the 
conditions for true peace under Communist 
leadership had come to pass. The reaction oi 
the Supreme Soviet to Khrushchev’s and 
Bulganin's remarks therefore indicated a lack 
of interest in the relaxation of tensions 
exemplified by the "Spirit of Geneva” but 
enthusiasm for the continuing struggle for 
mir.
Since the Soviet concept of peace is so ambitious, 
it is not surprising that their much proclaimed (and 
sincere) desire for "peaceful coexistence” implies much 
more than an acceptance of the status quo or 
pluralistic tolerance. As Nikita Khrushchev defined 
it:
Peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social orders does not mean the end of the 
class struggle. Peaceful coexistence not 
only does not exclude the class struggle but 
is itself a form of the class struggle 
between victorious socialism and decrepit 
capitalism on the world scene, a sharp and 
irreconcilable struggle, the final outcome of 
which will be the triumph of Communism 
throughout the entire world.
When Leonid Brezhnev rose to the top of the Soviet 
hierarchy, he became the most active promoter of
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detente within the Party while retaining the 
t iitional Soviet concept ot In his speech tf>
* he ’4t i\ Congress of the Soviet communist Party, hr 
outlined his foreign policy goals. He began by 
reiterating the traditional policy of peaceful 
coexistence and also stressing the need to prevent 
another world war by restraining the aggressors in the 
imperialist camp. He stated that ’’the general c: in in 
of capitalism has continued to deepen, " point ing o n 
that the U.S. was beset by internal divsion; anj t 
the Third World was fulfilling Lenin’s prediction by 
successfully engaging in national liberation struggles 
against the imperialists. Soviet foreign policy was to 
take advantage of these trends:
Concious of its international duty, the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union will 
continue to pursue a line in international 
affairs which helps further to invigorate the 
world-wide anti-imperialist struggle, and to 
strengthen the fighting unity of all its 
part icip&nts.
The full triumph of the socialist cause 
all over the world is inevitable. And we 
shall not spare ourselves in the fight for 
this triumph, for the happiness of the 
working people!^
In Brezhnev's view, arms control was not 
incompatible with a continuing struggle with the 
imperialists. Instead, arms limitation and disarmament 
would play an important role in reducing the danger of
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world war and saving economic resources for more
c< Hint : set i’ t .Ks . Thus,
The struggle for an end to t he arms race, 
both in nuclear and convertional weapons, and 
for disarmament--a 11 the way to general and 
complete disarmament--will continue to be one 
of the mo t important lines in the foreign 
policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet: 
state.10
It appears that from the start the Soviet Union 
and the United States had widely different views on the 
relationship between arms control and political 
settlements. In the American view, arms control made 
sense only when accompanied by an overall lessening of 
conflict. In the Soviet view, it was pointless to 
expect an end to conflict between capitalism and 
socialism; it was an inevitable historical process. 
What needed to be done was to lower the scope of the 
conflict so that the Soviets would be spared another 
world war while capitalism met its demise. Arms 
control was to play an important role in this area, 
although complete disarmament was probably not 
considered a serious prospect.
The Impact of Linkage on SALT I
Even before the Nixon administration had devised
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the policy of linkage, international politics had 
already affected arms control adversely. The first 
SALT negotiations were originally to take place in 1968 
under the Johnson administration, but just before the 
start of the talks, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia 
in order to stamp out the stirrings of liberal reform. 
In protest, the U.S. cancelled the talks temporarily, 
and in the transition from Johnson to Nixon, the talks 
were delayed altogether for over one year. It has been 
asserted that this delay was partly responsible for the 
failure to achieve a MIRV ban;11 given Soviet nuclear 
doctrine at the time, it is not likely that such a ban 
could have been achieved anyway. Nevertheless, it was 
a most inauspicious beginning for SALT I.
When the Nixon administration came into office, it 
dashed hopes for an early start to arms control talks. 
Nixon believed that the Soviets were more desirous of 
SALT, so he intended to delay the talks and pressure 
the Soviets for concessions on the Middle East and 
Vietnam while developing a strategy for approaching the 
talks. A series of domestic pressures and bureaucratic 
insubordination forced him to cut linkage short and 
agree to starting SALT without prior Soviet 
concessions.1  ^ Nevertheless, Nixon was still to use 
linkage throughout the talks— he would not sign a SALT 
agreement unless some progress was made in areas of 
U.S.-Soviet relations other than arms control.
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The major flaw in the Nixon-Kissinger concept of 
linkage was the assumption that the Soviets needed SALT 
more than the U.S. did, and that the arms control talks 
could be used for bargaining leverage. In fact, as 
Nixon and Kissinger later claimed, the U.S. was in a 
weak bargaining position in the area of strategic 
weapons. Kissinger has noted a number of times how 
difficult it was to negotiate from strength in SALT 
while the American military budget was being slashed 
and the Soviet build-up relentlessly continued.^ His 
views have merit, but it would logically follow then 
that the U.S. needed SALT more than the Soviets. In 
that case, it was definitely unwise to attempt to use 
an area of weakness for bargaining leverage.
In any case, the Soviets made it clear from the 
start that they did not care for the concept of 
linkage. Arkady Shevchenko writes that many Soviet 
diplomats were "incensed" by Nixon's use of linkage. 
There were several reasons for this. First, the 
Soviets did not have as much control over North Vietnam 
or their Arab allies as the Americans thought; Soviet 
allies were rather stubbornly independent. Second, it 
was a Soviet ideological imperative to aid "progressive 
forces" in the Third World. To restrain these forces 
from advancing would destroy the very foundation of 
Soviet foreign policy. Finally, Gromyko felt that 
Soviet concessions to lower international tensions
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before SALT could be finalized were a form of advance 
payment which could not be counted on to be 
returned— Gromyko is said to have repeated the cliche 
”A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” whenever 
the subject of linkage was brought up.**
It was probably the ideological imperative which 
was the most important factor in the Soviet rejection 
of linkage. The problems of Soviet influence over its 
allies and the question of U.S. reciprocity were 
transient factors, but the ideological foundation of 
the Soviet state could not be tampered with. It would 
be like asking the U.S. to renounce the Constitution in 
order to improve relations with the Soviets.
As with nuclear doctrine, there was some diversity 
of viewpoints within the Soviet hierarchy concerning 
the application of ideology to foreign policy. 
However, the coalition of forces within the Soviet 
Politburo and Central Committee were all in general 
agreement that detente could be accepted only so long 
as the struggle for the triumph of world-wide socialism 
continued; any differences over policy were tactical. 
For example, Shevchenko notes that while Gromyko was a 
strong proponent of detente and even willing to accept 
the short-term division of Vietnam to get on with 
detente, he was hardly an advocate of a stable balance 
of power:
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In 1970, at a meeting of diplomats in the 
Foreign Ministry in Moscow, Andrei Gromyko 
made a statement that was a model of clear 
intent which has in no way changed over the 
years: ,The foundations of our foreign policy 
built by Lenin remain fully and totally valid 
today, and detente in no way has changed our 
ultimate objectives. But Lenin also taught 
us to be clever in our dealings with leaders 
of capitalist countries.'
Gromyko pointed out that it was necessary 
to stress the importance of normal 
businesslike relations, not to frighten other 
nations by bluntly revealing Communism's real 
objectives. . . . Privately, in conversations 
at his dacha in Vnukovo, he was even more 
candid, advising us to pretend in our talks 
with Americans that we ourselves did not take 
some Marxist dogmas seriously. 5
The search for unilateral advantage through 
delinkage was a Soviet policy within the sphere of arms 
control as well. When the U.S. finally agreed to the 
beginning of SALT talks, the Soviets stalled for 
several months in the hope of Congressional 
restrictions on the U.S. ABM system. Later, they 
pushed for an ABM ban only as a first step, rejecting 
Nixon's demand for a linkage of offensive and defensive 
weapons limitations. After a while, it was finally 
agreed to negotiate an ABM ban first but ratify it only 
at the same time as an agreement on offensive 
limitations.1* This kind of linkage made a great deal 
of sense, for ABMs were the main counter to the Soviet 
offensive build-up and it would be extremely difficult 
to get Soviet agreement on offensive restrictions 
otherwise. As it turned out, even Nixon's use of
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linkage was not able to pressure the Soviets to 
substantially reduce their offensive threat, but the 
strategic position of the U.S. would probably have been 
worse had there been no attempt to link offensive and 
defensive restrictions in SALT I.
While the SALT talks progressed, various 
international incidents could not help but affect the 
negotiations. At one point during the talks, two U.S. 
Army generals accidently crossed the Soviet border in 
an airplane and were forced down and detained by the 
Soviets. After a number of delays trying to get them 
back, General Allison of the American SALT delegation 
confronted Soviet General Ogarkov about the matter. 
Ogarkov denied knowledge of the incident and said that 
it was not related to SALT anyway. General Allison 
replied that this was difficult to reconcile with the 
"need for mutual understanding and cooperation to limit 
strategic arms." On a later occasion, General Allison 
protested the Soviet firing upon an American plane 
flying over international waters.17 While perhaps these 
incidents did not have a major effect on the conduct of 
the talks, they must have eroded the mutual confidence 
and cooperation that General Allison noted were 
required to work out the details of an agreement.
Another crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations arose 
during the India-Pakistan war, when the Soviets backed 
India's offensive while the U.S. sided with Pakistan.
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SALT negotiator Gerard Smith felt that linkage was not 
a good idea and that arms control had an "independent 
value" uf its own, but he does admit in his memoirs 
that linkage was in some sense a reality in the 
presence of this crisis in relations: "[C]learly world 
events were linked and he [Nixon] expressed some doubt 
that one could have confidence in the U.S.S.R. in SALT 
if it was aiming to outmaneuver us in other areas."1®
Perhaps the touchiest linkage issue was the 
Vietnam War, and it is interesting to see how the 
linkage policy was applied, or rather not applied, 
here. Initially Nixon expected Soviet help in ending 
the war, but as this did not pan out and progress was 
made in a number of other areas of U.S.-Soviet 
relations, the Vietnam War was eventually delinked 
voluntarily by both superpowers. This did not come 
about easily, however. In the pre-summit negotiations 
with the Soviets, Nixon pressured Kissinger to make 
Vietnam the primary issue, but Kissinger practiced a 
judicious insubordination by downplaying Vietram and 
discussing other issues. Kissinger believed that 
Vietnam was simply non-negotiable with the Soviets, and 
that to make this issue the main bone of contention 
would surely lead to a summit cancellation and the 
destruction of all the other areas of progress in 
U.S.-Soviet relations.19 Nixon was most skeptical of 
this delinkage, but later accepted Kissinger's view and
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did not criticize him for his insubordination.2^
What Nixon and Kissinger did agree upon 
wholeheartedly was that while detente could proceed 
without Soviet help in achieving peace in Vietnam, it 
could not proceed while South Vietnam fell to a 
Soviet-backed offensive. Consequently, at the height 
of the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, when South 
Vietnam was on the verge of collapse, Nixon made a 
momentous decision. He escalated the war with a 
massive bombing campaign against Hanoi and a mining of 
Haiphong harbor. Meanwhile, he ordered that summit 
preparations were to continue; the onus for 
cancellation would be shifted to the Soviets.2* The 
U.S. SALT delegation was ordered to do "business as 
usual" and "express regret" if the Soviets walked 
out.22 Thus did Nixon attempt purposely to unravel 
linkage. The question was, would the Soviets 
cooperate? There was a great deal of pessimism on the 
American side; most thought that the Soviets would 
cancel the summit in response to the escalation in 
Vietnam.2^
Actually there was no need to worry, for the 
Soviets had already decided that the summit would go 
through no matter what. They had invested too much 
time and effort into detente to see it all wasted.24 
There was some disagreement in the Politburo over 
this— Petr Shelest, the Ukrainian Party leader,
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dissented vigorously and was sacked by Brezhnev. But 
the rest of the Soviet leadership believed a temporary 
setback in Vietnam would not eliminate the prospects of 
achieving world-wide socialism in the long term.^5
The American side could hardly believe the 
restrained Soviet response to the escalation in 
Vietnam. Gerard Smith describes a reception given to 
the SALT delegation at the Soviet embassy:
Here we were, bombing the capital of their 
socialist ally and mining its chief port, 
where Soviet ships were at anchor and tied up 
to docks. What should be said at such a 
social occasion by hosts and guests? The war 
was not mentioned. The silence about Vietnam 
was deafening. The hospitality seemed warmer 
than ever. Apparently SALT was to take 
priority. This was linkage in reverse. . . . 
We went back to work confident that the 
Soviets really wanted SALT agreements.26
Soviet behavior at the summit was nearly similiar. 
Kissinger describes the meeting with the Soviet leaders 
aj "jovial” and "congenial,” except at one moment when 
the subject of Vietnam was brought up. While Nixon 
attempted to delink Vietnam from overall relations, 
describing it as a "collateral issue,” the Soviets 
launched a three-hour shouting match against Nixon over 
Vietnam.27 But as Kissinger notes, it only seemed to be 
an act; the Soviets made no direct threats and seemed 
to be making hostile comments just for the record. 
Afterwards, the friendly atmosphere returned, as if
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nothing had happened.2** SALT I was signed and the 
summit turned out to be a grand success. Linkage no 
longer seemed to be a factor. Or was it?
It must be noted that while linkage was flexible 
as a policy, it still remained as a reality throughout 
the summit and afterward. It appeared as if SALT I was 
delinked from Vietnam, but its successful completion 
was still conditional upon events in Vietnam. One must 
look at the context in which SALT I was signed. While 
there was an escalation of conflict in Vietnam, the 
important factor was that South Vietnam was holding and 
America's objectives in preventing the victory of a 
Soviet client were succeeding. Had South Vietnam been 
defeated in 1972 while the U.S. was still involved, the 
reality of linkage would have emerged and dealt arms 
control a serious blow. For it was necessary to have a 
psychological balance and an atmosphere of cooperation 
between the two superpowers where both sides respected 
the power of the other and worked together on the basis 
of equality. As Kissinger put it,
We could not fraternize with Soviet leaders 
while Soviet-made tanks were rolling through 
the streets of South Vietnamese cities and 
when Soviet arms had been used decisively 
against our Interests for the second time in 
six months.29
Nixon felt the same: "It was hard to see how I could go
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to the summit and be clinking glasses with Brezhnev 
while Soviet tanks were rumbling through Hue or 
Quangtri.”30
It could be argued that SALT had only tenuous 
connection to events in Vietnam and could proceed as 
usual no matter what happened there— and in fact, arms 
control efforts did continue after the fall of Saigon 
in 1975. But it is a mistake to think of arms control 
as some unemotional technical exercise. Arms control 
is a form of diplomacy— it lies at the juncture of 
military and diplomatic strategy— and relies on the 
very things which traditional diplomacy ha3 always 
relied on: a calm dialogue, trust, and mutual respect. 
Although the impact is difficult to measure, the 
Vietnam War and other "national liberation movements” 
backed by the Soviet Union contributed to an American 
disillusionment with Soviet-American diplomatic 
agreements, among them, arms control.
The need for trust in diplomacy does not mean a 
naive faith in the goodness of one's counterpart; 
rather, each side must perceive that the other prefers 
the benefits of cooperation to the benefits of 
unilateral advantage. It is not always clear which set 
of benefits the other side prefers most; various events 
can bring doubt upon prevailing perceptions. Despite 
the conventional wisdom that all arms control 
agreements with the Soviets have been verifiable, there
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is still a factor of trust which cannot be ignored. 
Due to the ambiguity of the strategic balance, the 
difficulty of determining real intentions, and the 
non-verifiability of many qualitative aspects of 
weaponry and laboratory research, there has been and 
will always be a need for trust chat the other side 
approaches arms control in earnest and not as a tactic 
in achieving superiority. Attempts to gain unilateral 
advantage in the geopolitical sphere cannot help but 
raise fears that one side is seeking strategic 
superiority as well.
Mutual respect is another factor that cannot be 
quantified or verified by satellite, but is essential 
to the diplomatic atmosphere of arms control. If one 
side suffers a number of international setbacks at the 
expense of the other, then it is difficult to deal in 
the sphere of strategic weapons on the basis of 
equality. The first side will be at a psychological 
disadvantage and the other side will be emboldened to 
become more intransigent. Again, it must be stressed 
that there is a strong human element in diplomacy which 
cannot be wished away. If anyone doubts the necessity 
of a stable international environment for arms control, 
consider the impressions of Arkady Shevchenko:
After the fall of Saigon, 1 and many other 
Soviets were deeply surprised at America's 
acceptance of this final humiliation. 
Others# especially the party ideologues# were
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elated. They saw in Vietnam the proof of the 
decay they long claimed was sapping Western 
strength and will. It seemed a resounding 
argument for a much tougher line with the 
capitalist world, especially the United 
States. *
This kind of development was hardly conducive to an 
arms control process based on mutual respect with the 
aim of strategic parity.
Conclusion to Chapter Two: The Impact of Linkage on 
Arms Control
While linkage can be used or discarded as a 
bargaining tool, Nixon and Kissinger were correct in 
asserting that linkage would always remain, even in a 
diminished form, as a reality* The reality of linkage 
did not prevent the completion of SALT I because 
relations in many areas were good at the time and 
Vietnam was stalemated. What is important to note, 
however, is that the superpowers still had profoundly 
different conceptions of detente which formed the basis 
for later actions inimical to arms control.
As with nuclear doctrine, the U.S. did not fully 
perceive that the Soviets had different conceptions 
about the ideal international order. Kissinger was not 
sure whether the Soviets were turning over a new leaf 
with detente or using it as a tactic to expand
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further.32 This ambivalence about Soviet aims was 
reflected by the treaty of Basic Principles of 
Relations Between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It 
was an innocent-sounding document extolling the 
principles of "equality/” "mutual accomodation," 
"peaceful means," etc., but the U.S. made a mistake by 
agreeing to include the concept of "peaceful 
coexistence” in the treaty. For the Soviets, "peaceful 
coexistence" had always been defined as a tactic in the 
ultimate overthrow of capitalism— this is surely not 
what the U.S. wanted. Even the relatively dovish 
Raymond Garthoff has remarked that the U.S. should have 
at least provided its own definition of "peaceful 
coexistence" in the treaty.33 The Soviets were quite 
happy with the seeming acceptance of peaceful 
coexistence by the U.S. Brezhnev regarded the Basic 
Principles agreement as more important than SALT I.34
That the Soviets had fundamentally different ideas 
about detente was demonstrated soon after the signing 
of SALT I. Hopes for Soviet "restraint" or "help” on 
the Middle East or Vietnam were in vain. Instead, the 
Soviets provided massive amounts of military aid to 
North Vietnam, enabling it to disregard the peace 
accords and launch a final offensive against South 
Vietnam in 1975. The Soviet military build-up 
proceeded at a quick pace in all areas. The newly 
acquired naval transport capability was used to ship
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25,000 Cuban troops to Angola and boost Soviet 
influence in the region considerably. The absence of 
an American response led many Soviet leaders to believe 
that the U.S. had an "Angolan syndrome" as well as a 
"Vietnam syndrome. "33 But while the U.S. was not 
willing to get involved in another far-flung 
engagement, it was also becoming very skeptical about 
the benefits of detente. A debate in the U.S. over 
relations with the Soviets arose and put SALT on hold 
until the 1976 elections.3®
The Soviets did not demonstrate any sympathy for 
American concerns. If anything, they were more adamant 
than ever about supporting "national libera* ion 
struggles." As Brezhnev stated at the 25th Party 
Congress in 1976:
Some bourgeois leaders affect surprise and 
raise a howl over the solidarity of Soviet 
Communists, the Soviet people, with the 
struggle of other peoples for freedom and 
progress. This is either outright naivety 
[sic] or more likely a deliberate befuddling 
of minds. It could not be clearer, after 
all, that detente and peaceful coexistence 
have to do with interstate relations. This 
means above all that disputes and conflicts 
between countries are not to be settled by 
war, by the use or threat of force. Detente 
does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it 
abolish or alter, the laws of the class 
struggle.37
The rhetoric of "class struggle" was emphasized even 
more in the secret sessions of the Central Committee.3®
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The final straw for the U.S. was the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. While the Soviets considered 
it a prudent act of ensuring the march of socialism 
throughout the world, nearly all Americans considered 
it the most blatant act of Soviet military intervention 
of the post-World War II era. President Carter, who 
had previously been rather naive about the Soviets, 
suddenly became a hawk. The SALT II treaty, which was 
already under attack with detente, was withdrawn from 
Senate consideration. Not officially ratified, the 
treaty has still been observed to this day. The 
important point, however, is that the numerous Soviet 
geopolitical offensives contributed to the discrediting 
of the SALT process and paved the way for an 
administration with substantially different ideas about 
arms control— ideas which have not exactly brought 
greater benefits than SALT.
Arms control suffered from problems other than 
linkage. Even assuming benign relations between the 
superpowers, there are inherent limitations to the 
human ability to devise an objectively "fair" 
agreement. The difficulties of devising a reliably 
equal balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
will be discussed in Chapter Three.
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Chapter Three
In the abstract it might not seem so difficult to 
devise a treaty based on parity; one merely allocates 
approximately equal numbers of weapons on both sides. 
In the case of nuclear weapons, many point out that 
equal levels are irrelevant due to the overkill factor; 
once a certain number of weapons is reached, then there 
is no point in adding more to keep up with the other 
side, for there is already enough to destroy the other 
side one or more times. Worst-case analysis has been 
frequently derided as being based on unjustified fears 
or a secret desire for more weapons-~witness the 
mythical "missile gap," "bomber gap," and "window of 
vulnerability."1 Stalemates and breakdowns in arms 
control negotiations are attributed to either 
intransigence by both sides or mutual paranoia based on 
misunderstanding.
Such an interpretation is not justified. A 
computation of the strategic balance involves a myriad 
of factors, many of which are difficult to quantify. 
The doctrine of overkill is grossly simplistic— after 
all, nuclear weapons do not necessarily have to be used 
for the mass extermination of civilians but may be used 
to destroy an enemy's nuclear weapons in a first strike
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and thereby protect one's own homeland. That is why 
even the strongest believers in the overkill doctrine 
destroy their own argument when they express concern 
about the destabilizing qualities of new weapons 
systems. It is an unavoidable fact that worst-case 
analysis is a legitimate tool of security policy.
The Case for "Worst-Case"
Physicist Freeman Dyson tells of an argument he 
once had with the civilian strategist Herman Kahn in 
which he couldn't seem to convince Kahn that the Soviet 
civil defense system posed very little threat. After 
referring to Kahn as "paranoid," Kahn replied:
Of course I'm paranoid. Didn't you know 
that? I make it my business to be paranoid. 
You had to be paranoid in 1933 to believe 
Hitler would exterminate the Jews, and you 
had to be paranoid in 1941 to believe the 
Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.2
The point Kahn was making wus expressed earlier in his 
book On Thermonuclear War: "History has a habit of
being richer and more ingenious than the limited 
imaginations of most scholars or laymen."3
This point is well worth consideration, for it 
illustrates a perennial problem of national security:
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dealing with the unknown. History is replete with 
examples of worst case fears that turned out to be 
true, or not "worse" enough. Sometimes a situation 
arises which does not fit any previously considered 
possibilities.
Consider a hypothetical military balance between 
two sides, A and B. Side A is equipped with 136 
divisions, 4000 armored vehicles, and an extensive 
system of fortifications. It is superior in artillery 
and is widely considered to be the best army in the 
world. Side B has 98 divisions and 2800 armored 
vehicles, but is superior in air power. It might seem 
that side A has a slight edge, but in fact sides A and 
B correspond to France and Nazi Germany respectively in 
1940.4 Considering that France was overrun in six weeks 
with only minimal German looses, it is clear that 
calculating a military balance is not an exact science. 
France's "worst-case" was not predicted beforehand and 
even the Germans were rather surprised by their own 
success.
The problem lies not only in attempting to 
calculate the quality of men and equipment on both 
sides. In the case of World War II, the French troops 
were rated rather highly by the German panzer general 
Heinz Guderian, and French tanks had better armor and 
firepower, while their German counterparts had the 
advantage of speed.5 So the Battle of France in 1940
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was not decided primarily on the basis of qualitative 
differences. A more accurate assessment would be thaf 
the German advantage lay in their strategic and 
tactical concepts: factors which are most difficult to 
quantify. But even then, the Battle of France was not 
a foregone conclusion; the German blitzkrieg could have 
been stopped, given the right conditions.
Contrary to popular impression, the French did not 
lose because of their "Maginot Line complex.” As the 
apostle of armored warfare himself, Basil Liddell Hart 
put it, the Maginot Line might have succeeded in 
braking the German advance but for the fact that it did 
not extend far enough and the Germans were able to 
burst through the gap between the Anglo-French armies 
in the north and the Maginot Line in the south. The 
French thought this gap was covered by the "impassable” 
Ardennes forest, but the Germans discovered that it was 
in fact quite passable to tanks. Were it not for this 
gap in the French defenses, Liddell-Hart and German 
General Manstein conclude, the German attack would 
probably have been stalemated.^ That there was a gap in 
the line which the Germans discovered and exploited can 
perhaps be attributed to that most elusive factor, 
luck.
Some may object that nuclear weapons have brought 
a vast increase in destructive power which makes 
traditional military-historical analyses like the one
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above obsolete. This is a good point, but the break 
with the past is not complete. Nuclear weapons have 
certainly made the prevention of world war the highest 
priority. Only a madman could have the same confidence 
in winning a nuclear war as Hitler had in his 
blitzkrieg. Yet, there is still the possibility of a 
situation arising in which the international situation 
is extremely tense, military forces are fully poised, 
and while nobody wants war, it may seem to one or both 
sides that getting in the first blow would be the least 
undesirable alternative. It is the task of worst-case 
analysis to determine all the possible situations in 
which the opposing side might resort to nuclear war, as 
well as to imagine all the forces that side might 
acquire in the future to increase the chances of its 
recovering from such a war. As I have pointed out 
before, one cannot consistently argue that it is 
impossible under any circumstances to win or survive a 
nuclear war and at the same time criticize 
destabilizing weapons systems such as the Pershing II, 
MX, and Strategic Defense Initiative. For it is in the 
very nature of destabilizing weapons to increase the 
chances of surviving a nuclear war through a first 
strike.
That worst-case analysis is a legitimate tool of 
policy cannot be denied. However, some might question 
whether this tool has been misused by the United
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States. Has the U.S. usually exaggerated Soviet 
intentions and abilities and accelerated the arms 
race to meet nonexistent threats? The historical 
record does not support such a contention.
The most celebrated case of worst-case analysis 
gone haywire is the "nissile gap." Yet the continual 
references to this "gap," as well as the "bomber gap" 
and the "window of vulnerability" demonstrate only the 
selective use of evidence. First of all, the record 
shows that American intelligence was approximately 
correct in estimating how many missiles the Soviets 
would deploy in the early 1960s. What was wrong in the 
calculations was the estimated mixture of various types 
of missiles. Instead of concentrating on 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviets 
directed most of their resources toward intermediate 
and medium-range ballistic missiles, since the European 
theater of war was so much more important to them. So 
while the U.S. overestimated the number of Soviet ICBMs 
that would be deployed, it underestimated the number of 
Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs and did not grossly exaggerate 
Soviet capabilities.7 It should also be remembered that 
what inspired fears of a Soviet advantage in ICBMs was 
the quite unexpected Soviet launch of 
Sputnik— unexpected because the U.S. had underestimated 
Soviet technical capabilities.
There are other examples of underestimations of
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Soviet military capabilities. In 1945 it was widely 
thought that the Soviets would not acquire an atomic 
bomb for twenty to fifty years.® The Soviets tested 
their first A-bomb in 1949. From 1962 to 1972 the 
Defense Department continually underestimated the 
number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers that the Soviets 
would build. Some of these American errors were due to 
ethnocentric assumptions about Soviet nuclear doctrine. 
American planners thought at first that the Soviets 
would accept a MAD posture and settle for a smaller 
nuclear force than America's. As the Soviet build-up 
continued to the level of the U.S. arsenal, they then 
predicted that the Soviets would settle for equality.® 
But Soviet ICBMs exceeded those of the U.S. by over 500 
when the levels were finally frozen by SALT I. Later, 
military planners predicted that the accuracy of Soviet 
warheads would not threaten the American Minuteman 
force until after 1985; that estimate had to be moved 
up by three years. Henry Kissinger testified before 
the U.S. Senate in 1979:
As one of the architects of SALT, I am 
conscience-bound to point out that— against 
all previous hopes— the SALT process does not 
seem to have slowed down Soviet strategic 
competition, and in some sense may have 
accelerated it. 0
My point here is not to prove that the U.S.
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usually underestimates the Soviet threat. Rather, I 
hope the above examples demonstrate that there has not 
been a consistent exaggeration of the Soviet strategic 
capability through worst-case analysis. American 
defense planners have, on the whole, been prudent in 
estimating the other side, given the unknowns involved. 
The existence of unknowns is inherent in the ambiguous 
nature of the military balance, in perceptions of 
Soviet intentions, in predictions of future military 
deployments, and in predictions about the international 
situation several years hence. It is the American and 
Soviet attempts to deal with such unknowns through 
worst-case analysis and the impact of these attempts on 
SALT I, which will be the subject of the rest of this 
chapter.
American Worst-Case Concerns in SALT I
It has always been difficult to discern accurately 
what lies behind the Iron Curtain. The highly 
secretive nature of Soviet society is seen particularly 
in the sphere of security. Satellites can take highly 
magnified photographs of what is happening on the 
surface but they cannot see what is happening 
underground or inside a building. Despite the 
tremendous strides in verification technology made by
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the time of SALT I, there was still no foolproof method 
of preventing all Soviet cheating. If the Soviets 
wanted to cheat badly enough, they could find ways to 
do it— but fortunately, there were limits to the amount 
of cheating that could be accomplished before eventual 
U.S. discovery. Thus, before the Nixon administration 
began SALT negotiations, it instructed the CIA to study 
the verifiability of various types of weapons 
limitations, how much cheating could occur before 
discovery, and whether this cheating would affect the 
strategic balance substantially. The Defense 
Department was charged with the task of drawing up 
contingency plans for rectifying the balance quickly 
should cheating occur.11 In this way, worst-case fears 
were alleviated.
However, there were limitations to this approach. 
As a general rule, the more qualitative restrictions 
that are sought, the greater are the problems of 
verification. It is easy to count up the numbers of 
weapons, but it is difficult to determine with 
confidence the capabilities of such weapons systems and 
it is impossible to verify the nature of technological 
research unless there is universally open on-site 
inspection. Complaints that arms control treaties have 
been rertricted to quantitative limits and that 
technology is not being controlled reflect inadequate 
understanding of the problem of verification. It takes
110
an extraordinary amount of time and effort to hammer 
out a treaty with even relatively simple restrictions.
In the absence of widespread qualitative 
restrictions, the defense planner has only one 
recourse: he must continue research and development on 
new weapons systems or risk falling behind. He cannot 
know for sure the nature of an opponent's research; he 
may be surprised, as in the case of the first Soviet 
A-bomb or Sputnik. The Secretary of Defense during 
SALT I, Melvin Laird, discussed the problem in a report 
to Congress:
Because the Soviet Union is a closed society, 
they can conduct their military research and 
development programs behind a thick veil of 
secrecy, making it very difficult for us to 
assess their progress in a timely manner. . .
We cannot base our own research and 
development effort solely on an estimate of 
the Soviet technological threat. We simply 
do not have enough knowledge to assess the 
threat properly. The only prudent course is 
to advance our knowledge at a reasonable pace 
in every area of significance to our future 
military strength.12
Thus it was inevitable from the start of SALT that the 
arms race wo^ld continue in the technological sphere. 
The only way to put an end to technological competition 
would be for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to establish a 
degree of openness and cooperation rivalling the 
"special relationship" between the U.S. and Great 
Britain. And if that were the case, there would be no
Ill
need for arms control because there would be no arms 
race.
The restrictions on arms which are verifiable 
cannot provide full confidence either, for security 
planning must involve looking at the future. One 
problem is the possibility of breakout, that is, the 
scrapping of arms control treaties in favor of a full 
scale mobilization and strategic build-up in all areas. 
Breakout would most likely occur during a period of 
high international tension. In such a sudden 
acceleration of the arms race, one side may jump ahead 
significantly because of better advance planning, prior 
cheating, and an industrial base that can be switched 
quickly for military purposes. It is generally 
regarded that the Soviet Union is in a better position 
to jump ahead early in a breakout.^
The problems of technological advance and breakout 
had a negative impact on SALT I. The Defense 
Department was adamantly opposed to the pursuit of a 
MIRV ban in SALT, for it felt that MIRVs were needed to 
provide extra insurance against future Soviet advances. 
The feared advances lay in a number of of areas. While 
Secretary of Defense Laird believed that the fleet of 
Poseidon submarines would be invulnerable throughout 
the 19708, he also noted that he could not guarantee 
the invulnerability of any weapons system more than 
five to seven years in the future.14 Predicting the
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possibility of an ABM breakout was even more difficult. 
The Soviets already had an extensive defense system 
against aircraft, and many American defense planners 
feared that the Soviets could adapt this system of 
radars and SAMs within a short time to shoot down 
incoming missiles as well. This was known as 
"SAM-upgrade.” To this concern was added the difficulty 
of verifying limitations on a qualitative system such 
as MIRVs.^  The American defense planner's nightmare 
was that a breakout in a number of areas could result 
in a Soviet capability to launch a preemptive attack 
and use an ABM system to absorb the weakened 
retaliatory strike. MIRVs were intended to provide 
insurance against this possibility by allowing more 
warheads to survive a preemptive attack and penetrate 
Soviet defenses.
The most unpredictable factor was Soviet 
intentions. The debate over the true nature of Soviet 
nuclear doctrine is a reflection of this uncertainty. 
American SALT negotiator Gerard Smith had his concerns:
I never stopped worrying during SALT about 
the Soviets possibly using the negotiations 
to mask deployment of a much larger missile 
force than the United States. . . .
Each time photographs from satellites were 
flown over to us abroad and we saw the 
relentless build-up of ICBM silos, the 
delegation wondered when the Soviet build-up 
would stop. My concern about what the 
Soviets are aimina for has never been 
entirely dispelled.1”
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The natural response of the defense planner is to 
deploy more weapons as a hedge against the 
uncertainties over the other side's intentions.
A particular concern of American strategists was 
the potential vulnerability of the United States to a 
phenomenon known in analysts' jargon as "escalation 
dominance." Escalation dominance has been defined as 
the ability to prevent an opponent from escalating a 
conflict by demonstrating the adverse consequences of 
such a move. The capability of escalation dominance 
allows one side to coerce an opponent while keeping the 
conflict limited. The concern over a Soviet capability 
to coerce the United States in a limited war was the 
basis of the embellished MAD doctrine of the U.S. in 
the early 1970s, described earlier in this paper. A 
doctrine of pure MAD would be sufficient to deter an 
all-out Soviet attack, but there was a possibility of a 
less than total attack occurring. In such a situation, 
the U.S. needed more options than massively escalating 
or doing nothing.
The typical worst-case scenario went as follows: 
An international crisis arises in which the Soviets are 
pressured to launch a nuclear strike against the United 
States. The Soviets carefully limit their attack to 
military targets, destroying much of the American 
deterrent in the process. After the attack, the U.S.
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does not have enough weapons left to make an effective 
retaliatory strike against Soviet military targets. 
There are enough weapons to devastate Soviet cities, 
but the Soviets threaten to destroy American cities in 
return should the President make such a move. Rather 
than choose mutual suicide, the President decides to 
cave in to whatever demands the Soviets make.*7 This 
scenario is made more credible by the fact that there 
are a number of cases in which the U.S. has been using 
its nuclear deterrent to protect far away interests and 
allies, but might not be willing to commit suicide for 
these less than absolutely vital concerns.
The American strategist's response to escalation 
dominance is to deploy fcrces capable of responding on 
any possible level of attack. Frequently, the terms 
'•ladder of escalation” or "spectrum of deterrence” are 
used. The key requirement of military force, then, is 
flexibility. The 1973 Defense Report to Congress 
headed its section on strategic nuclear forces with a 
quotation from President Nixon stressing not only the 
need to deter an all-out surprise attack:
Our forces must also be capable of flexible 
application. A simple 'assured destruction* 
doctrine does not meet our present 
requirements for a flexible range of 
strategic options. No President should be 
left with only one strategic course of 
action, particularly that of ordering the 
mass destruction of enemy civilians and 
facilities.11
There is also an ethical worst-case argument that 
in case of nuclear war, one should not resort to the 
extermination of innocents but should restrict 
targeting for a militarily useful purpose. One of the 
earliest advocates of tactical nuclear weapons was not 
a bloodthirsty hawk, but Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, who 
was sickened by the Strategic Air Command*s plans for 
the destruction of Soviet cities as a response to a 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe. More recently, 
strategists such as Albert Wohlstetter and scientists 
such as Robert Jastrow have been arguing the moral 
superiority of military targeting.19
The concern over escalation dominance in limited 
nuclear war has been roundly criticized by a number of 
analysts. The window of vulnerability scenario in 
particular has a number of flaws. There are enormous 
difficulties in envisioning a credible limited nuclear 
war scenario. Yet, while the concern has been
exaggerated, one should not dismiss the possibilities 
of escalation dominance completely. As long as the 
Soviet Union retains a large number of accurate nuclear 
warheads, it would not be wise to reduce the American 
deterrent to a force capable only of mass 
extermination.
In sum, during SALT I there were a series of 
worst-case concerns on the American side arising from
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uncertainties over Soviet intentions and the future 
possibilities of war. Most of these concerns were 
legitimite; they reduced the scope for a successful 
cooperative effort to limit strategic weapons. 
Meanwhile, the Soviets had their own worries.
Soviet Worst-Case Concerns During SALT I
Soviet fears were in part parallel to U.S. fears 
but also different in many respects. The openness of 
American society meant that there would be less chance 
of a surprise development/ but the American mood was 
somewhat unpredictable and the Soviets could never know 
for sure whether the U.S. might fully use its two main 
assets/ technological superiority and economic 
strength. Despite the repeated boasts in Soviet 
military writings of the scientific-technical and 
economic superiority of the Socialist bloc, in private 
the Soviets had an inferiority complex--and with good 
reason. While they were occasionally able to spring a 
technological surprise on the U.S.f the Soviets were 
able to do this only by a tremendous concentration of 
minds and resources on one project. Across the board, 
American technology was usually ahead. In particular, 
by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet ABM 
system was doing poorly in tests compared to the
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American system. The Soviets took note of this 
disturbing development and quickly switched their 
previous position rejecting an ABM ban.
The Soviet concern over an American breakout in 
ABMs was evident in SALT. They could not accept a thin 
ABM system, and even a few sites could provide the core 
for a nation-wide system. Long, tedious negotiations 
were necessary to pin down the exact requirements for 
an ABM site that would not pose an immediate threat of 
breakout.
The Soviets were also concerned about the 
substantial economic power of the United States. The 
U.S. had a GNP twice that of the Soviets; if Western 
Europe and Japan were added to the U.S. side, the ratio 
was five to one. In the early 1970s, the Soviet 
leadership was already being warned by its economic 
experts about the setbacks in agriculture and consumer 
goods that would come about with the going rate of 
military spending.^2 They must have seen that an 
all-out arms race could put a very heavy strain on the 
Soviet economy.
A major worry of the Soviet Union was the "third 
country threat.” While the U.S. was worried for a time 
about the Chinese nuclear force and was preparing to 
deploy a thin ABM system because of it, Nixon's opening 
to China practically eliminated such fears overnight. 
The Soviet Union, however, could not rest so easily.
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Not only did they have to deal with the Chinese threat, 
but there were the French and British nuclear forces, 
as well as the NATO nuclear bombers. The major Soviet 
objective in SALT, therefore, was "equal security,” 
that is equal protection from the threats each side 
perceiv e d . A s  the Soviets had more enemies than the 
United States, this raised a number of problems in the 
talks.
One of the primary stumbling blocks in the SALT I 
negotiations was the "forward-based systems” issue, or 
FBS. These systems were the American fighter-bombers 
of NATO capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Soviet 
territory. While American negotiators argued that 
these weapons posed no first-strike threat and were not 
a major cause of the arms race, a general on the Soviet 
delegation replied that when the hospital he had been 
in during the war was bombed, it gave him no comfort 
that the culprit was a fighter-bomber rather than a 
heavy bomber. The debate dragged on.24
Both sides had a valid point. The Soviets felt 
they faced a real threat from American nuclear forces 
based in Europe; it is likely that these forces would 
be used in the event of a major war between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The Soviets claimed that their 
own nuclear forces in Europe could logically be 
excluded from negotiations based on equal security, 
since these forces did not have the range to threaten
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the United States. On the other hand, the American 
side could not risk upsetting the alliance by 
negotiating limits on NATO nuclear forces while 
excluding the Soviet forces which threatened Western 
Europe; it would demonstrate a lack of commitment to 
the alliance and result in a lopsided nuclear balance 
in Europe.
The FBS dilemma plagued the SALT negotiations 
throughout. It prevented a more comprehensive set of 
limitations on offensive weapons in time for the 1972 
summit and proved to be a sticky issue thereafter.26 
Today the problem has emerged in the form of the 
Pershing missiles issue.
Another threat the Soviets faced was the Chinese 
military force. In some ways, the Soviets seemed to 
fear the Chinese even more than the Americans. During 
the border clashes of 1969, the two powers were on the 
brink of war and the Soviets seriously considered a 
nuclear strike against the Chinese, but were dissuaded 
by the prospects of a long drawn-out war and warnings 
from the Nixon administration that the U.S. would not 
stand idly by. So instead, they deployed a huge 
contingent of military forces equipped with nuclear 
weapons all along the Soviet-Chinese border.26 And they 
would not be satisfied with notions of parity or 
stability; the ability to retaliate against a Chinese 
attack was not as important as the ability to destroy
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Chinese military and nuclear forces before they could 
threaten the U.S.S.R. This was the essence of Soviet 
damage-limitation doctrine. It meant that the Soviets 
had to have a large first-strike force poised against 
the Chinese. This they accomplished; despite 
assertions to the contrary, the Soviet first-strike 
threat against China is greater now than ever before.27
At the SALT talks, the Soviets never mentioned 
China by name, but in Gerard Smith*s words, it often 
seemed a "specter at the table".29 In discussions with 
Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviets continually tried to 
work out an arrangement of Soviet-American collusion 
against the Chinese. Brezhnev underlined his fear of 
China in one conversation with Nixon:
Ten, in ten years, they will have weapons 
equal to what we have now. We will be 
further advanced by then, but we must bring 
home to them that this cannot go on. In 
1963, during our Party Congress, I remember 
how Mao said: 'Let 400 million Chinese die; 
300 million will be left.' Such is the 
psychology of this man.29
More recently, it is reported that Brezhnev expressed 
similiar sentiments to Prime Minister Thatcher: "Madam, 
there is only one important question facing us, and 
that is the question whether the white race will 
survive." "
The ultimate Soviet nightmare was a coalition of
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the Western countries and China against them, either in 
a Cold War or a real war. They could easily imagine a 
two front war against economic-technologically superior 
enemies on one side and numerically superior enemies on 
the other. And despite the rhetoric about the great 
unity of the Socialist camp, the Soviets were probably 
also aware of the potential fragility of their empire 
in a crisis. There was always a fear in the back of 
their minds that Eastern Europe, the Baltic 
nationalities and the Central Asian nationalities could 
rise in revolt if given the opportunity.
Finally, while the Soviets, like the U.S., were 
concerned with the possibilities of a surprise 
first-strike, they could not assuage their worries by 
developing a survivable second-strike force along 
American doctrinal lines. For the Soviets could never 
quite be convinced that the threat of retaliation could 
prevent war. Their tragic history told them otherwise, 
and the conspiratorial nature of Soviet politics did 
not encourage a less paranoid attitude. Recall the 
comments made by the so-called pragmatists in the 
Soviet Union about the inadequacy of basing security on 
a stable balance of terror.^
The numerous Soviet worst-case concerns did not 
bode well for arms control. Many of their fears were 
legitimate, but the United States could not accommodate 
them without reducing its own security. China could
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hardly be counted on as a reliable ally of the United 
States. There was a real possibility that the Chinese 
would stay clear of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, 
leaving the U.S. to face the full force of the Soviet 
military. There was also the possibility that the 
Western European allies would disassociate themselves 
from the U.S. in the event of a U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation over a peripheral issue. The 
unpredictability of the future does not allow for an 
objectively "fair” military balance. Even mathematical 
models and scientific analysis cannot provide greater 
certainty. Consider the following assessment of the 
military balance in Europe:
A NATO worst case would be a surprise 
attack by Russia's European forces and Warsaw 
Pact allies on Germany. The combat value of 
Russia's land forces is 676. Let's assume 
500 could be quickly commited to the attack 
and they obtained a 400 percent surprise 
bonus, producing an effective combat value of 
2000. Defending would be NATO forces with a 
vr-ue of 600. This gives Russia a 3.3-to-l 
ratio. If French forces are included, the 
ratio declines to 2.6 to 1. These ratios 
make a quick victory possible but not 
certain. . . .
From the Russian point of view, the worst 
case is a collapse of their Eastern Europe 
hegemony, followed by a NATO invasion. This 
leaves Russian forces without their allies as 
well as the portion of their own forces to 
cope with the ex-allies. The net Russian 
forces available for defense might have a 
combat value of only 300. NATO could muster 
a value of 500 for an attack. With surprise, 
this could be at least doubled, for a forces 
ratio of 3.3 to 1. This is a worrisome 
prospect, especially exacerbated by the 
political tensions within Russia.32
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Uncertainties over security have driven the 
Soviets to actions at odds with arms control, in 
particular, the damage limitation doctrine discussed in 
Chapter One. They have attempted to acquire military 
superiority against any possible combination of 
enemies; parity with the U.S. was simply not enough. 
Doubts over their ability to wage a long war 
successfully drove them to rely on a first-strike 
capability as a better guarantor of security than 
crisis-stability. While viewing arms control as a 
useful way to limit American weaponry, they did not 
feel a stable balance of terror was a desirable goal 
from the standpoint of security. As their doctrine 
became clearer in the SALT negotiations and military 
build-up, American worst-case concerns became 
aggravated and the arms race continued.
Conclusion to Chapter Three: The Impact of Incompatible 
Security Concerns on SALT I
There ie much to be said for mutual cooperative 
efforts to bring about increased security for all 
sides, but it has not been said often enough that there 
are limits to this approach which make arms control 
less successful in practice than in theory. The fact
is that there can be no reliably stable balance between 
the superpowers or any set of powers.
Given the limitations of verification, it was 
inevitable that the arms race would continue even if 
the strictest limits were agreed to in SALT I. As it 
turned out, after the signing of SALT I, Nixon and 
Brezhnev noted to each other that each side would 
naturally proceed in building weapons not covered by 
the agreement.^3 There was no other choice and both 
sides recognized it, unless they were willing to base 
their security on the good intentions of the other 
side.
The Soviet and American build-ups were motivated 
by generally legitimate concerns, some of them 
similiar, some different. For the U.S., a continued 
build-up was required for insurance against a 
preemptive strike and escalation dominance. 
Consequently, work went ahead after SALT I on the 
Trident submarine, the B-l bomber, and the MX. As the 
Soviet capability for knocking out U.S. Minuteman 
missiles grew, American worries increased. Paul Nitze, 
who was involved in the original SALT negotiations, 
raised the prospect of a "window of vulnerability" for 
the U.S. in a 1976 article in Foreign Policy.3* While 
exaggerating the stakes for the U.S., he did point to 
an imbalance that needed to be corrected before further 
Soviet advances did have a decisive effect.
The way the U.S. attempted to correct the 
imbalance, however, tended to cause a corresponding 
decrease in Soviet security. The problem was not 
merely that the U.S. intended to foreclose the 
first-strike option to the Soviets. For to prevent 
escalation dominance, the U.S. decided it needed a 
substantial counterforce capability. But the Soviets 
could not trust the U.S. to use a counterforce 
capability only in a second strike; reading th< ir own 
doctrine into U.S. intentions, they perceived a growing 
first-strike threat from American forces. In the 
meantime, China’s economic and military might continued 
to grow.
By the early 1980s, the military competition 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continued unabated, 
despite the fact that the most comprehensive arms 
limitations in history were in effect. While it could 
be argued that the competition would be even worse 
without SALT II, it was an unfortunate fact that the 
world did not feel substantially more secure because of 
arms control. It was not the first time that the 
limitations of the naci* state system frustrated the 
ingenuity of man.
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Conclusion: The Lessons of History?
In a recent attempt to uncover the "lessons of 
Vietnam," two authors concluded in the pages of Foreign 
Affairs that it was impossible to reach any conclusions 
about Vietnam since the topic was too close to the 
present and none of the various observers could agree 
as to the correct lessons.* Actually, even this 
assessment may be too optimistic--it is entirely 
possible that once we all agree on the lessons of 
Vietnam we will all be wrong.
Be that as it may, no historical study is complete 
without at least some tentative conclusions, and the 
subject of arms control is of great importance to the 
present. Before this last chapter offers some possible 
solutions to the problems which have plagued arms 
control, we should decide what it is about arms control 
which makes it so desirable— in other words, what is 
the purpose of arms control, or what should it be? The 
answer is not necessarily obvious.
"Stopping the arms race" is a simple way of 
defining the goal, but it is too simple. For there are 
circumstances in which a partial arms race may be 
preferable to control. Arms control advocates should 
reconsidtt their praise of the ABM ban in SALT I.
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Instead of preventing a destabilization of the 
strategic balance, it may have made the prospect of a 
first-strike greater by leaving missile sites 
undefended. The world might actually be safer today if 
ABMs were allowed to proliferateSo instead of aiming 
for the vague goal of stopping the arms race, it would 
be better to make distinctions among various types of 
weapons as to stability,verifiability, destructiveness, 
etc. and to determine which set of limitations would be 
most practical and desirable.
The goal of saving money for humanitarian concerns 
is often raised as a goal of arms control. However, 
sometimes better opportunities for preventing nuclear 
war can be achieved by spending more money than normal. 
For example, the development of a triad of nuclear 
forces was certainly more expensive than a 
concentration one one mode of delivery, but this 
investment was worthwhile for protecting our deterrent. 
The Midgetman missile is a more costly missile than 
normal, being based on a mobile system with only one 
warhead per missile, but it is well suited for crisis 
stability. Finally, if we wish to move away from 
nuclear weapons and rely more on conventional weapons 
and manpower as part of a "no first-use" declaration, 
we must realize that conventional forces will be much 
more expensive than nuclear weapons.
The primary foal of arms control should be to
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increase security for the nations involved. In 
particular, the purpose of nuclear arms control should 
be to prevent nuclear war and, if possible, reduce the 
potential destruction of such a war. If a more secure 
international system can be achieved, then secondary 
objectives, such as the savings in resources, may 
follow. And the stage will be set for actual 
disarmament instead of mere control. But the primary 
concern should be security; the other goals cannot be 
achieved without this.
With a clearer view of our objectives, we can now 
proceed with a discussion of how to overcome the 
problems of arms control. Nuclear doctrine is the most 
important factor. Not only must we know know how the 
Soviets are planning their nuclear forces, we must 
know how to plan our own forces as well.
First, a caveat. Although this study deals with a 
very contemporary subject, it is already somewhat 
obsolete. There are indications that Soviet nuclear 
doctrine has undergone some changes since the early 
1970s. Open Soviet pronouncements at least no longer 
call for superiority and victory, but parity and 
detente. General Ogarkov and the new generation of 
Soviet military officers is coming to power and appear 
to have different views on the utility of nuclear 
weapons. Ogarkov has reportedly said that an all-out 
nuclear war is not a practical military option; he is
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currently leading a major revision of Soviet military 
doctrine which concentrates primarily on the ability to 
win a quick conventional war on the Eurasian 
continent. ^  It is not clear whether this implies a 
greater acceptance of MAD as a doctrine; it could mean 
that the Soviet military is still waiting for further 
technological breakthroughs to reduce the 
destructiveness of all-out war. A great deal depends 
on how far the Soviet political leadership is willing 
to go to shape doctrine and on how the United States 
shapes its doctrine.
The U.S. has a number of doctrinal options, each 
with different approaches to security. In examining 
each option, we should determine which doctrine would 
provide the most security for the present and which 
doctrine would be most desirable for the future.
Current U.S. doctrine is known as 
"countervailing." It relies on a large number of highly 
accurate weapons to carry out prompt counterforce 
retaliatory strikes and target the centers of Soviet 
leadership and control in order to ensure that the 
Soviet Union would not be able to survive as a state. 
This doctrine also Includes a number of limited war 
options. This countervailing doctrine came about as a 
response to the Soviet build-up and the revelations of 
Soviet military writings, but it is also an 
overreaction in which the cure may be worse than the
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disease.
As I have noted before, while the Soviets may 
desire a war-winning capability, they have little 
confidence that their present capability can achieve 
such a goal. A substantial American counterforce 
capability can ensure that the U.S. will never be 
vulnerable to escalation dominance and that the Soviet 
state will never survive a nuclear exchange, but this 
added insurance creates a new problem. The Soviets can 
never be persuaded that the U.S. counterforce 
capability will be used only in a second strike; they 
fear that the U.S. may use its forces in a preemptive 
attack. Given that the Soviet leadership (like the 
American) would probably resort to nuclear war only in 
the event of a very grave threat to the existence of 
the state, it seems likely that a U.S. counterforce 
capability will increase the risk of nuclear war.
Current plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative 
are not apt to provide greater security either. There 
appear to be two conceptions of space-based defenses. 
The first uses SDI in a doctrine of strategic 
superiority and damage limitation— similiar to the 
ideas expressed in Soviet military writings. It calls 
for the deployment of highly accurate weapons to 
destroy Soviet military and leadership targets and 
space-based A&Ms to limit damage to the United States. 
In the abstract, a position of U.S. nuclear superiority
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would be desirable; the problem of crisis stability 
could be overcome if enough ABMs were deployed to 
protect U.S. forces from a preemptive attack and the 
U.S. could have more confidence in deterring the Soviet 
Union. The problem with the doctrine of nuclear 
superiority lies in the difficulty of attaining it 
safely. The Soviets will certainly try to keep from 
falling behind and the competition will accelerate 
greatly, increasing worst-case fears, adversely 
affecting U.S.-Soviet relations in other areas, and 
possibly making the strategic balance worse than 
before. The potential benefits of nuclear superiority 
are not worth the costs and risks of attempting to 
attain it.
A second doctrine put forward with respect to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative is a "defensive 
transition." Supposedly, a movement to a more stable 
balance with increased protection from the threat of 
nuclear weapons can be achieved through technological 
advance in defensive systems. It is unfortunate that 
many otherwise intelligent conservatives have become 
enthusiastic supporters of this concept;4 their 
fantasies are as naive as many liberals' undying faith 
in international law and world organization. There are 
so many ways to overcome, outflank, or outsmart a 
defense— MARVs (maneuverable reentry vehicles), decoys, 
low-trajectory submarine-launched missives, bombers,
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cruise missiles, suitcase bombs--that most experts 
agree that there is no reliable way to protect our 
cities if the Soviets wish to make us vulnerable.
The justification that many then give for SDI is 
that it will provide more stability by protecting our 
deterrent from a first strike. However, SDI is not 
necessarily the best answer to the first-strike threat. 
We can achieve the same results by improving our 
submarine fleet, increasing the penetration capability 
of our bombers, and building mobile land-based missile 
systems. Should these systems become vulnerable, we 
can deploy a ground ABM defense protecting missile 
silos. Deploying a space-based system prematurely may 
bring up more problems than it solves, for such a 
defense can deflect a retaliatory strike as well as a 
first strike and may itself be vulnerable to a 
preemptive attack. Even Edward Teller, hardly a dove, 
has noted the vulnerability of space systems and 
advocates a "pop-up" laser system instead.5
Most of the drawbacks of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative could be overcome by a cooperative defensive 
transition, but given the sorry state of arms control 
and U.S.-Soviet relations today, pushing for such a 
goal is most premature. A negotiated defensive 
transition would probably be the most complex 
diplomatic undertaking ever attempted; preventing a 
destabilization of the strategic balance during the
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transition would require a scale of cooperation jtween 
the twc superpowers that is unprecedented. Our efforts 
would be best directed toward building a base for 
cooperation first instead of rushing headlong into a 
weapons development and hoping for Soviet compliance.
A frequently-offered alternative to the above 
doctrines is a nuclear freeze. Its main virtues are 
simplicity and comprehensiveness; these are also its 
main defects. By attacking the problem of the arms 
race, it ignores the real problem, which is security. 
Not all weapons are detrimental to security. Because 
of the non-verifiability of limitations on air defense 
systems, ABM research, and anti-submarine research, in 
the event of a nuclear freeze, the arms race would 
still continue in those areas and raise the prospect of 
a breakout upsetting the balance. A better policy 
would be to continue developing stabilizing weapons 
such as bombers, submarines, and mobile single-warhead 
missiles, while negotiating to reduce destabilizing 
systems such a# accurate MIRVed land-based missiles. A 
nuclear freeze is an emotional statement, not a good 
policy.
In my view, a posture of "Kftit-plus,N that i^ a 
capability for destroying cities but also a military 
targeting option which falls short of a significant 
first-strike threat, is the M a t  option. For this 
purpose, our current military build-up should proceed
without the MX missile and a good portion of the D-5 
warheads for the Tridentsf but continue with the 
Midgetman missile and the accurate air-launched cruise 
missiles for the B-l and Stealth bombers. The 
resulting force would provide a great deal of insurance 
against escalation dominance while providing less of an 
incentive for the Soviets to preempt.
For the future, the U.S. should keep a two-track 
policy in mind, one of cooperat * n through arms 
control, and the other a unilateral military build-up. 
These paths should be pursued simultaneously, with 
greater concentration on one or the other dep ending on 
the circumstances. Our military build-up should 
concentrate on maintaining a state of mutual deterrence 
and frustrating any unilateral attempts on the part c.f 
the Soviets to gain a war-winning capability. However, 
this goal should be only temporary; we must explore the 
option of reducing and eliminating our vulnerability to 
mass destruction. This can come about only through a 
cooperative effort on the part of the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union to limit and reduce nuclear weapons while 
allowing defensive systems to proliferate and provide 
insurance against the non-verifiable aspects of a 
negotiated agreement.®
As I have noted above, a cooperative defensive 
transition would be immensely difficult, and it is most 
premature and irresponsible to expect to achieve it
wit h  the current state of affairs. What is n e e d e d
first is a more stable strategic balance with a greater 
confidence in the security of both sides. For this 
purpose, it may be best to negotiate first down to a 
position of pure MAD, that is a mutual capability to 
target each other's cities only. A unilateral move to 
a posture of pure MAD would not be desirable, for there 
are legitimate fears of escalation dominance. But if 
both sides can simultaneously achieve a pure MAD 
posture, then the strategic balance will be much more 
secure.
Some may argue that it would be unwise and immoral 
to base out nuclear policy on the mutual destruction of 
civilians. But this objection does not hold up to 
iogie. No matter how many military-targeting options 
are added to strategic plans, there will always be the 
option of aiminq them at cities. Even with the best of 
intentions, there is not much cause for confidence that 
a nuclear war would significantly spare civilians from 
the destruction. Removing the military-targeting 
option through MAD merely removes a rung from the 
ladder of escalation; as long as nuclear weapons exist, 
there is always the possibility of the mass 
annihilation of civilians. Besides, once a MAD posture 
were achieved, the chances would be better for a 
cooperative defensive transition.
Assuming that both superpowers can agree on the
136
desirability of stabilizing the strategic balance with 
an eye toward a defensive transition, there are still 
two other obstacles to arms control, linkage and 
worst-case. Linkage would appear to be an unresolvable 
problem, given the superpowers' vastly different 
conceptions of the ideal international order. However, 
there may be a way to outflank the problem. Looking at 
the Vietnam example, if progress can be made in a 
number of areas of U.S.-Soviet relations, it may be 
possible to let some of the contentious issues fall to 
the side, and agree to disagree. In this case, some 
geopolitical competition between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union would continue, but the two sides would 
choose to compete on a lower level and at the same time 
make it clear to each other that they do not seek 
superiority in the sphere of nuclear weapons. For this 
purpose, negotiations should proceed on two fronts: one 
to deal with political issues and the other to discuss 
nuclear doctrine. Naturally, both sides cannot be 
expected to discuss the details of their war plans, but 
since Soviet military writings and Defense Department 
reports eventually become public knowledge, both sides 
might as well engage in discussions over how to prevent 
war and what will be done if war breaks out. Perhaps 
there will be no agreement over the basics of nuclear 
doctrine between the two sides, but at least the 
discussions could reveal the real differences and not
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raise unreasonable expectations.
The final obstacle to arms control is the 
worst-case fears which come about whenever there are 
uncertainties involved in calculating the strategic 
balance. This obstacle is so tremendous, there seems 
to be little chance of attaining an arms control 
agreement with stricter limitations than SALT II. Yet, 
if worst-case planning is a problem for arms control, 
arms control itself is a partial solution. Negotiated 
agreements provide better knowledge of forces on both 
sides and can help to make the strategic competition 
more predictable. This case is illustrated best by the 
MIRV ban issue of the early 1970s. While the U.S. 
military did have legitimate concerns about Soviet 
breakout in preemptive capabilities, it did not take 
note of the fact that a mutual ban on MIRVs would go a 
long way in preventing a Soviet preemptive capability. 
Although Soviet military doctrine at the time would 
have probably blocked a combined ban on MIRVs and ABMs, 
the U.S. military should have been on the record as 
supportive of a MIRV ban.
In fairness to the U.S. military, they have been 
generally supportive of SALT II, recognizing the many 
worst-case fears that would arise if SALT II were 
scrapped and the competition became completely 
unrestrained.7 Many do seem to recognize that arms 
control can reduce the uncertainties in security
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planning. It is still an open question as to just how 
far arms control can go in reducing uncertainties in 
the strategic balance.
In the introduction to this study, I set out a 
rather pessimistic view that the decline of arms 
control was an inevitable process brought about by deep 
structural problems existing in SALT I. In the 
interest of maintaining some hope, I do not wish to 
imply that all our efforts in dealing with the nuclear 
problem will be as unsuccessful as our past efforts. 
The scope for human action is limited, but we do not 
know our exact limits unless we contine to strive for 
the utmost. Just as it was impossible to predict a 
hundred years ago that we would eventually learn to 
release the tremendous energy of the atom, it remains 
to be seen whether we can discover a way of controlling 
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